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Abstract
This Note argues that the Fifth Amendment privilege prohibits the U.S. government from
compelling individuals to offer testimony that would incriminate them in criminal proceedings
outside the United States. Part I explores the development of the Fifth Amendment’s privilege
against self-incrimination. Part II discusses the conflicting positions that have emerged in lower
courts concerning the Fifth Amendment’s extraterritorial application. Part III argues that the Fifth
Amendment protection regarding self-incrimination should apply to the risk of non-U.S. prosecution. This Note concludes that the principles reflected in the enactment of the Fifth Amendment
and its treatment in both U.S. and English courts warrant the extraterritorial application of the
self-incrimination privilege.

NOTES
SEEKING REFUGE IN THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE
APPLICABILITY OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION TO INDIVIDUALS WHO RISK
INCRIMINATION OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES,
INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits
federal and state governments from compelling individuals to
testify if that testimony could be used against them in any domestic criminal prosecution.' To invoke the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination with success, claimants
must demonstrate a real and substantial risk that the compelled testimony could be used against them in further prosecution. 2 Although the privilege against self-incrimination applies to individuals when their testimony may be used against
them in domestic criminal prosecutions, a question still exists
regarding the application of the privilege to individuals whose
testimony may subject them to extraterritorial prosecutions.3
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides that
[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
Id. In Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), the U.S.
Supreme Court held that one jurisdiction in the U.S. federal system may not compel
a witness to give testimony that might incriminate him under the laws of another
jurisdiction. Id. at 77-78. The privilege against self-incrimination applies whether
the testimony is compelled by the federal government and used by a state or compelled by a state and used by the federal government. Id. The Court also has held
that the privilege against self-incrimination is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement by the states. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
2. See Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 48081 (1972) (holding that substantial fear of non-U.S. prosecution is necessary to present constitutional question); see also Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486
(1951); Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 365-66 (1917); Heike v. United States,
227 U.S. 131, 144 (1913); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599-600 (1896) (all holding that Fifth Amendment does not protect against remote or speculative possibilities
of criminal prosecution).
3. See Zicarelli, 406 U.S. at 478 (stating that question concerning whether Fifth
Amendment privilege may be invoked by individuals who fear prosecution outside
United States remains open).
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The U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed this issue, and the
lower courts have reached conflicting results.4
;!In addressing the Fifth Amendment's application to individuals who risk prosecution outside the United States, lower
courts differ with respect to the extraterritorial reach of the
privilege against self-incrimination. Some lower courts have
extended the privilege, stressing the history of the Fifth
Amendment and its treatment in the courts. 5 Other courts
have refused to apply the privilege against self-incrimination
extraterritorially on the ground that the extension of this privilege would frustrate law enforcement activities. 6
4. See id. Compare Moses v. Allard, 779 F. Supp. 857, 882-83 (E.D. Mich. 1991)
and Mishima v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 131, 135 (D. Alaska 1981) and In re
Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080, 1086 (D. Conn. 1972) (all extending Fifth Amendment
to protect against threat of non-U.S. prosecution) with United States v. (Under Seal),
794 F.2d 920, 925 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,.479 U.S. 924 (1986) and In re Parker, 411
F.2d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 1969), vacated as moot, 397 U.S. 96 (1970) and Phoenix
Assurance Co. of Can. v. Runck, 317 N.W.2d 402, 413 (N.D.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
862 (1982) (all holding Fifth Amendment privilege does not apply when risk of prosecution arises outside United States).
5. See, e.g., Moses, 779 F. Supp. at 882; Cardassi,351 F. Supp. at 1086 (both holding that history, language, and policies of amendment demonstrate that amendment
should extend to fear of non-U.S. prosecution). In Moses, the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan held that a debtor, Ms. Moses, could refuse to answer questions in a bankruptcy proceeding regarding her assets in Switzerland.
Moses, 779 F. Supp. at 882-83. The court held that the privilege against self-incrimination protected individuals from testifying when such testimony could be used
against them in a foreign prosecution. Id. at 874. The court comprehensively examined the history, language, and policies of the Fifth Amendment and found that
the Amendment should protect against the risk of prosecution outside the United
States. Id. at 882-83. In Cardassi, a grand jury witness refused to testify despite having been granted immunity because she claimed that her testimony could be used
against her in a criminal prosecution in Mexico. The court allowed Ms. Cardassi to
invoke the privilege against self-incrimination to protect against the risk of foreign
prosecution. Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. at 1086.
6. See, e.g., Parker, 411 F.2d at 1070; Runck, 317 N.W.2d at 412 (reasoning that
extraterritorial extension would frustrate U.S. government's purpose for granting
immunity). In Parker, the witness refused to answer all questions at a grand jury proceeding. The proceedings involved alleged violations of sabotage or destruction of
war materials and war utilities. Parker, 411 F.2d at 1069. Although Ms. Parker was
granted immunity from domestic prosecution, she refused to testify, invoking her
Fifth'Amendment privilege against self-incrimination on the ground that she risked
prosecution in Canada. Id. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit refused
to extend the privilege to the risk of foreign prosecution, reasoning that an extension
of the amendment would allow it to protect against acts that are not considered criminal in the United States. Id. at 1070. In Runck, Phoenix Assurance Co. of Canada
brought an action against Mr. Runck and others claiming insurance fraud as a result
of a fire. Runck, 317 N.W.2d at 404-05. During discovery proceedings, the defend-
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This Note argues that the Fifth Amendment privilege prohibits the U.S. government from compelling individuals to offer testimony that would incriminate them in criminal proceedings outside the United States. Part I explores the development of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against selfincrimination. Part II discusses the conflicting positions that
have emerged in lower courts concerning the Fifth Amendment's extraterritorial application. Part III argues that the
Fifth Amendment protection regarding self-incrimination
should apply to the risk of non-U.S. prosecution. This Note
concludes that the principles reflected in the enactment of the
Fifth Amendment and its treatment in both U.S. and English
courts warrant the extraterritorial application of the self-incrimination privilege.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
PRIVILEGE
In interpreting the scope of the privilege, many U.S.
courts analyze the history and policies behind the development
of the amendment. 7 Individuals may invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination only if they demonstrate a real and substantial risk of prosecution deriving from
their testimony. 8 Once such individuals have shown a substantial risk of prosecution, the Fifth Amendment allows them to
refuse to provide self-incriminating testimony. 9
A. History of the Right Against Self-Incrimination
The

privilege

against

self-incrimination

may

have

ants each invoked their privilege against self-incrimination because they claimed that
their answers to questions could subject them to criminal prosecution in Canada. Id.
at 405. The court refused to extend the privilege's protection to the risk of foreign
prosecution. Id. at 413. The court stated that extending the privilege would frustrate
the government's ability to grant immunity and hinder the rationale supporting immunity statutes. Id. at 412.
7. See, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55-57
(1964).
8. Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972)
(noting that individual must show substantial fear of non-U.S. prosecution in order to
invoke protection of Fifth Amendment privilege); see supra note 2 and accompanying
text (discussing cases holding that Fifth Amendment does not protect against remote
or speculative possibilities of prosecution).
9. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 600 (1896).
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originated in ancient Judaic law.' 0 Although it is unclear
whether the privilege existed thousands of years prior to English common law, sparse references to a right similar to the
privilege against self-incrimination appear in the Talmud." In
ancient Judaic law, the, maxim that "a man cannot represent
himself as guilty, or as a transgressor" was an essential part of
criminal procedure in the Rabbinic courts. 12 Contrary to modern definition, this ancient Judaic rule supplied individuals
with an extremely broad right that could not be waived or relinquished. 1

Although the exact origin of the privilege against self-incrimination in ancient Judaic law is unclear, the privilege did
exist in medieval England. The privilege against self-incrimination developed in the Middle Ages as a shield against inquisitorial proceedings by ecclesiastical courts and the English Star
Chamber.' 4 During the sixteenth century, these courts often
compelled accused individuals to swear to an oath ex officio that
compelled them to give true answers to whatever questions
they were asked.' 5 A refusal to answer questions or to swear to
the oath was the equivalent of a guilty confession.' 6 These
courts would compel an individual to swear to the oath ex officio
without revealing to the individual the nature of the crime
brought against him.' 7
10.

LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGIN OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT AGAINST SELF-

INCRIMINATION 433 (2d ed. 1986); Norman Lamm, The Fifth Amendment and its
Equivalent in Jewish Law, 17 DECALOGUEJ., Jan.-Feb. 1967, at 1.
11. LEVY, supra note 10, at 433.
12. Id. at 434.

13. Id. The ancient Judaic rule prohibited an accused individual from confessing to a crime. Id. at 436-37. If an individual attempted to confess to a crime, that
confession was not admissible against him. Id.
14. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 446 (1956) (Douglas,J., dissenting),
overruled on other grounds by Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Quinn v.
United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955); ERWIN NATHANIEL GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT TODAY 2-7 (1955); LEVY, supra note 10, at

29; JOHN HENRY

WIGMORE, A

TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW

VIII, § 2250, at 289-90 (3d ed. 1940); see Kevin Urick, The Right Against Compulsory
Self-Incrimination in Early American Law, 20 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 107, 109 (1988);
Bret Alan Fausett, Note, Extending the Self-Incrimination Clause to Persons in Fear of Foreign
Prosecution, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 699, 702 (1987).
15. LEVY, supra note 10, at 47.
16. Id.; WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2250, at 273-76.
17. LEVY, supra note 10, at 47. During the Middle Ages, individuals who conducted ecclesiastical proceedings frequently used torture to make sure the accused
would speak. GRISWOLD, supra note 14, at 2.
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By the mid-seventeenth century, the oath ex officio was
abolished in England and the privilege against self-incrimination was established. 8 The privilege developed to protect individuals against persecution and torture by the government.' 9
In English common law, the privilege possessed an extremely
broad scope. 20 It protected against all injurious as well as incriminating testimony by a witness or defendant, and an individual could invoke the privilege merely to avoid defamation of
2
character. l
As the former American colonies developed toward the

end of the seventeenth century, English common law influenced the development of law in America.
The privilege
18. LEVY, supra note 10, at 313. The oath ex officio was abolished in 1637 during
the trial of John Lilburne for treason before the Star Chamber. Trial of John
Lilburne and John Wharton, 3 How. State Trials 1315, 1318 (1637); LEVY, supra note
10, at 304. John Lilburne refused to swear to the oath ex officio claiming that no one
could compel him to incriminate himself. Lilburne, 3 How. State Trials at 1318; LEVY,
supra note 10, at 274-77.
19. GRISWOLD, supra note 14, at 4; LEwis MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFrH
AMENDMENT? 14 (1959); R. Carter Pittman, The Colonial and ConstitutionalHistory of the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763, 778-79 (1935); see

Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 446 (1956) (Douglas,J., dissenting) (discussing English history that resulted in development of Fifth Amendment), overruled on
other grounds by Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
20. LEVY, supra note 10, at 29; see infra note 229 and accompanying text (describing broad scope of privilege in English common law).
21. See Ullmann, 350 U.S. at 449 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that "[tlhis
right of silence, this right of the accused to stand mute serves another high purpose
[to protect individuals against infamy and disgrace]"); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S.
591, 631 (1896) (Field, J., dissenting) (stating that aim of Fifth Amendment is to
protect accused from all compulsory testimony "which would expose him to infamy
and disgrace"); see also LEVY, supra note 10, at 427 (noting that "[tihe right not to be a
witness against oneself imports a principle of wider reach, applicable, at least in criminal cases, to the self-production of any adverse evidence, including evidence that
made one the herald of his own infamy, thereby publicly disgracing him").
22. See LEVY, supra note 10, at 368. Professor Levy observes that as the colonies
developed "the English common law was increasingly becoming American law ... as
[the colonies'] political and economic systems matured, their legal systems, most
strikingly in the field of criminal procedure, began more and more to resemble that
of England... the consequence was a greater familiarity with and respect for the right
against self-incrimination." Id.; see Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161-62
(1955). In Quinn, the Supreme Court stated that
[tihe privilege against self-incrimination is a right that was hard-earned by
our forefathers. The reasons for its inclusion in the Constitution-and the
necessities for its preservatioh-are to be found in the lessons of history. As

early as 1650, remembrance of the horror of Star Chamber proceedings a
decade before had firmly established the' privilege in the common law of
England. Transplanted to this country as part of our legal heritage, it soon
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against self-incrimination became permanently established in
U.S. law when it was written, without debate, into the U.S. Bill
of Rights. 23 The history of the privilege against self-incrimination indicates that its scope is not constrained by a restrictive
definition. 24 The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
did not supersede or limit the common law privilege, although
its wording may not
have encompassed the privilege's entire
25
historical meaning.
B. Purposes of the Fifth Amendment Privilege
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides
that "[n]o person ...shall be compelled in any criminal case to

be a witness against himself."26 This privilege against self-incrimination prohibits the federal and state governments from
compelling individuals to testify when such testimony could incriminate them.27 It protects both witnesses and defendants
throughout all stages of any public proceeding, including civil
as well as criminal cases.28
made its way into various state constitutions and ultimately in 1791 into the
federal Bill of Rights . . . To apply the privilege narrowly or begrudgingly-to treat it as an historical relic, at most merely to be tolerated-is to
ignore its development and purpose.
Id. (citations omitted); see Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914) (stating that "provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas having their
essence in their form; they are organic living institutions transplanted from English
soil").
23. See LEVY, supra note 10, at 430. Professor Levy notes that by 1776 the principle that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself had become
deeply ingrained. Id.
24. See id. at 428 (stating that phrase "privilege against self-incrimination" stunts
more expansive right not to give evidence against oneself); see also Brown, 161 U.S. at
631 (Field, J., dissenting) (noting that "[n]o phrases or words of any provision... in
the Constitution, are to be qualified, limited, or frittered away and that... [aIll are to
be construed liberally [so] that they may have the widest and most ample effect").
25. See LEVY, supra note 10, at 428.
26. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
27. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892), overruledon other grounds
by Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Moses v. Allard, 779 F. Supp. 857,
872 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
28. Counselman, 142 U.S. at 563. The privilege serves as a protection to individuals in criminal proceedings at the time of arrest, indictment, and trial. Id. In addition, the Supreme Court recognized that the government would undermine the protection of the privilege by compelling individuals to testify in a civil proceeding when
such testimony could be used against them in a criminal prosecution. McCarthy v.
Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924) (holding that constitutional privilege against selfincrimination protects individuals from unwillingly testifying in civil proceedings
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Many purposes support the self-incrimination privilege.
One strong policy underlying the privilege concerns the desire
to avoid the "cruel trilemma" of compelling an individual to

choose among self-accusation, perjury, and contempt of
court.29 In addition, the privilege demonstrates a preference
for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice.3" The development of the Fifth Amendment privilege illustrates the framers' view that the determination of guilt
or innocence as a consequence of fair procedure, in which indiwhen that testimony may be used against them in criminal prosecution); see R.D.G.,
Note, The Reach of the Fifth Amendment PrivilegeWhen Domestically Compelled Testimony May
Be Used in a ForeignCountry's Court, 69 VA. L. REV. 875, 877 (1983) (discussing application of privilege against self-incrimination to civil proceedings); see also Lefkowitz v.
Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805 (1977); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964);
Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 608 F.2d 1084, 1086 (5th Cir. 1979) (each
noting that Fifth Amendment protects individual in civil cases if testimony may incriminate individual in criminal prosecution).
29. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964);
see also Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638 (1990). In Muniz, the Supreme Court
discussed the policies supporting the privilege against self-incrimination in deciding
whether an answer to a question that was asked of an individual during a custodial
interrogation constituted testimonial evidence. Id. at 2641. The Court stated that
[alt its core, the privilege reflects our fierce "unwillingness to subject those
suspected of a crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or
contempt," that defined the operation of the Star Chamber, wherein suspects were forced to choose between revealing incriminating private
thoughts and forsaking their oath by committing perjury ....

Because the

privilege was designed primarily to prevent " a recurrence of the Inquisition
and the Star Chamber, even if not in their stark brutality," it is evident that a
suspect is "compelled ... to be a witness against himself" at least whenever
he must face the modern-day analog of the historic trilemma-either during
a criminal trial where a sworn witness faces the identical three choices, or
during custodial interrogation where, as we explained in Miranda, the
choices are analogous and hence raise similar concerns.
Id. at 2647-48 (citations omitted).
30. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55. As Professor Levy observes,
[b]y stating the principle [the privilege against self-incrimination] in the Bill
of Rights, which was also a bill of restraints upon government, [the framers]
were once again sounding the tocsin against the dangers of government oppression of the individual; and they were voicing their conviction that the
right against self-incrimination was a legitimate defense possessed by every
individual against government. Tough-minded revolutionists, the equal of
any in history in the art of self-government, they were willing to risk lives
and fortunes in support of their belief that government is but an instrument
of man, its sovereignty held in subordination to his rights.... The Constitution with its amendments was an embodiment of their political morality, an
ever-present reminder of their view that the citizen is the master of his government, not its subject.
LEVY, supra note 10, at 430-31.
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viduals are not compelled to testify against themselves, was
more important than punishing the guilty. 3 ' The framers intended to protect the innocent by designing a political and
legal system in which citizens are the masters of their government, not its subjects. 2 The framers purposefully created a
privilege that occasionally may be "a shelter to the guilty" because it is often "a protection to the innocent.13 3 The privilege focuses mainly on the individual's right to be free from
governmental abuse and excess.3 4 It protects the accused from
the risk of inhumane treatment and governmental abuse, supports the individual's right to be free from governmental interference, and protects the right of each individual to an enclave
in which the individual may lead a private life. 3 - The evaluation of these policies supporting the privilege has helped the
courts to determine its scope.3 6
31. See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 427 (1956), overruled on other
grounds by Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). In Ullmann, the Court
noted that "[the framers] made a judgment and expressed it in our fundamental law,
that it were better for an occasional crime to go unpunished than that the prosecution should be free to build up a criminal case, in whole or in part, with the assistance
of enforced disclosures by the accused." Id. (quoting Maffie v. United States, 209
F.2d 225, 227 (1st Cir. 1954)); see also LEVY, supra note 10, at 432 (stating that
"[a]bove all, the Fifth Amendment reflected [the framers'] judgment that in a free
society, based on respect for the individual, the determination of guilt or innocence
by just procedures, in which the accused made no unwilling contribution to his conviction, was more important than punishing the guilty").
32. LEVY, supra note 10, at 431.
33. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161-62 (1955). The Supreme Court
in Quinn stated that "the privilege ... was generally regarded then, [in English common law], as now, as a privilege of great value, a protection to the innocent though a
shelter to the guilty, and a safeguard against heedless, unfounded or tyrannical prosecutions." Id.
34. See GRISWOLD, supra note 14, at 3 (stating that Fifth Amendment privilege is
closely connected with struggle to eliminate torture as government practice); see also
Moses v. Allard, 779 F. Supp. 857, 873-74 (E.D. Mich, 1991) (stating that main policy
behind Fifth Amendment is to protect against governmental abuse).
35. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (citations omitted).
36. See id. at 54 (stating that "[t]he answer to this question [regarding the extension of the privilege to the risk of any domestic prosecution] must depend, of course,
on whether such an application of the privilege promotes or defeats its policies and
purposes"). But see HenryJ. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case For ConstitutionalChange, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 686-95 (1968). Judge Friendly analyzes and
criticizes the policies supporting the privilege. He concludes that "on balance the
privilege so much more often shelters the guilty and even harms the innocent." Id. at
687. Furthermore, in criticizing the argument that the Fifth Amendment protects the
privacy of individuals, Judge Friendly states that it is impossible to square the privacy
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C. The Treatment of the Right Against Self-Incrimination in English
Courts
In formulating the laws of the United States, the framers
of the Constitution adopted many aspects of English common
law. 3 7 The framers relied on English common law in developing the right against self-incrimination, and the U.S. Supreme
Court has analyzed English law to determine the scope of the
privilege against self-incrimination. 8 English law concerning
the extraterritorial application of the privilege has evolved
over the years, though it appears that the English common law
rule allowed the privilege to apply extraterritorially3 9
An important early English case dealing with the extraterritorial application of the privilege against self-incrimination is
East India Co. v. Campbell.4 ° In 1749, in East India Co., the English Court of Exchequer allowed a defendant to refuse to, testify regarding certain information that might have subjected
him to punishment in India. 4 1 The court unanimously held
interest purpose of the privilege with immunity statutes that require surrender of
privacy. Id. at 689. He also states that the "cruel trilemma" argument may be somewhat diluted by the abandonment of any thought of using contempt to compel an
answer. Id. at 695; see also STEPHEN SALTZBURG & DANIELJ. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 445-49 (4th ed. 1992) (discussing various policies supporting privi-

lege and supplying critical analysis that questions effectiveness of these policies).
37. See, e.g., Quinn, 349 U.S. at 161; Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 600 (1896);
see Urick, supra note 14, at 116 (stating that "[t]he persons who promulgated the Fifth
Amendment understood that the right against self-incrimination which the Fifth
Amendment was to guarantee would assume the same attributes with which common
law courts, in England and in America, had invested in that right").
38. See, e.g., Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955) (discussing history
of Fifth Amendment and its development from English common law); Brown, 161
U.S. at 600 (stating that U.S. courts should evaluate English court decisions concerning scope of rights set out in first eight amendments because these rights evolved
from English common law). Because the Fifth Amendment stems from English common law, the U.S. Supreme Court has analyzed English law regarding the scope of
the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Murphy, 378 U.S. at 57; United States v. Murdock, 284
U.S. 141, 149 (1931), overruled by Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378
U.S. 52 (1964) (both using English cases to assess scope of self-incrimination privilege concerning domestic prosecutions); see also Brown, 161 U.S. at 608 (discussing
English rule regarding defendant's failure to show real fear of subjection to laws .of
another sovereign).
39. Compare United States v. McRae, [1867] 3 L.R.-Ch. 79, 85 (Ch. App.) (holding that privilege against self-incrimination protected against risk of prosecution in
jurisdictions outside of England) with Civil Evidence Act, 1968, § 14 (Eng.) (limiting
privilege against self-incrimination to English domestic court proceedings).
40. 27 Eng. Rep. 1010 (Ex. 1,749).
41. Id. at 1011.
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that the right against self-incrimination protected the defendant from providing testimony when the defendant faced the
risk that such testimony would be used against him in a prosecution in India.4 2
In 1851, the Court of Chancery decided King of the Two
Sicilies v. Willcox. 43 In King of Two Sicilies, the court held that the
defendants could not refuse to testify in England despite their
risk of criminal prosecution in Sicily. 4 4 The court denied the
defendants' claim to the privilege against self-incrimination,
42. Id.
43. 61 Eng. Rep. 116 (Ch. 1851). At the time of the decision in East India Co. v.
Campbell, two parallel sets of courts existed in England. H.G. HANBURY, ENGLISH
COURTS OF LAW 105 (4th ed. 1967). One set of courts, the Courts of Chancery, were
courts of equity. Id. The other set of courts, consisting of the courts of Common
Pleas, Kings Bench, and Exchequer, administered the common law. Id. The Court of
Exchequer, which decided East India Co., also possessed some equitable jurisdiction.
Id. at 82. It was described as "straddl[ing] the gulf between the common law courts
and the courts of Chancery." Id. In 1842, however, the equitable jurisdiction of Exchequer courts was merged into that of the Chancery courts. Id. The Court of Chancery decided King of Two Sicilies after the equitable jurisdiction of these courts had
been merged.
44. King of Two Sicilies, 61 Eng. Rep. at 116. King of Two Sicilies involved a situation which developed during the uprising against the Austrian-controlled Bourbon
monarch Ferdinand the Second in Sicily. Id. Prior to 1860, Italy had never been a
united nation. Id. at 118. During the revolution, when the republican government
controlled the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, the government sent the defendants,
residents of Sicily, to England to purchase a steamship. Id. at 116. The money to
purchase the steamship was supplied to the defendants by many thousands of
Sicilians. Id. After Ferdinand the Second, the lawful sovereign of the Kingdom of
Two Sicilies, re-established his authority, he sued the defendants claiming ownership
of the steamship which was still berthed in the port of London. Id. In their answer to
the plaintiff's complaint, the defendants admitted the possession of documents relating to matters in the complaint. Id. One defendant refused to produce the documents, claiming that they would expose him to criminal prosecution in his home
country, Sicily. Id. at 117. The court held that the privilege against self-incrimination did not extend to the risk of prosecution in a foreign country. Id. at 128.
Although the court stated that the privilege existed only by virtue of England's own
municipal law, it stressed that a judge would be unable to know whether an act would
be criminal in a foreign country. Id. The court reasoned that in such a situation, a
judge is unable to assess the truth of the witness's alleged risk of prosecution in a
foreign country. Id. As the court stated,
[t]he impossibility of knowing as matter of law, to what cases the objection,
when resting on the danger of incurring penal consequences in a foreign
country may extend, furnishes very strong and, to my mind, satisfactory evidence that the objection cannot be sustained. It is to be observed that, in
such a case, in order to make the disclosure dangerous to the party who
objects, it is essential that he should first quit the protection of our laws, and
wilfully go within the jurisdiction of the laws he has violated.
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stressing the difficulty for an English judge of determining the
likelihood of a criminal penalty in Sicily on the basis of testimony given in England. 4 5 The court reasoned that the defendants would face prosecution on the basis of their testimony
only if they left the protection of England's laws and intentionally moved to the jurisdiction whose laws they had violated.4 6
In 1867, the English Court of Appeal in Chancery in
United States v. McRae 47 specifically overruled that part of King
of Two Sicilies that related to the privilege against self-incrimination. 48 In McRae, the defendant refused to answer questions
because the answers might have incriminated him in the
United States where a criminal prosecution was pending
against him. 49 Limiting King of Two Sicilies to its facts, the court
extended the privilege against self-incrimination to individuals
who feared prosecution outside England. 50 The Court of Appeal in Chancery held that King of Two Sicilies did not adequately assess the scope of the privilege but instead merely
evaluated the defendant's risk of prosecution. 51 To properly
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. [1867] 3 L.R.-Ch. 79 (Ch. App.). In McRae, the United States sued the defendant, a U.S. citizen, in England because the U.S. government sought an accounting and payment of money received by the defendant in England. Id. at 79. The
defendant received this money as an agent for the government of the Confederate
States of America during the American Civil War. Id. The defendant refused to answer questions contained in interrogatories, invoking his privilege against self-incrimination because his answers could have been used against him in a prosecution
that was pending in the United States. Id. The United States had passed a law confiscating the property of all individuals who had acted as agents for the Confederate
States, and had instituted proceedings against the defendant in the United States to
recover property that belonged to the defendant in that country. Id.
48. Id. at 85; The Courts of Appeal in Chancery had intermediate appellate jurisdiction between the chancery courts and the House of Lords, the highest court in
England. HANBURY, supra note 43, at 105.
49. McRae, 3 L.R.-Ch. at 83.
50. Id. at 85. The English rule set out in McRae, however, was restricted by
Parliament in 1968 when it enacted a law which limited the privilege to domestic
court proceedings. See Civil Evidence Act, 1968, § 14 (Eng.); see also, R.D.G., supra
note 28, at 893-94 (discussing conflict in English courts with respect to extraterritorial application of privilege and resolution of conflict in Civil Evidence Act, 1968,
§ 14); Daniel J. Capra, The Fifth Amendment and the Risk of ForeignProsecution, N.Y. L.J.,
Mar. 8, 1991, at 3 (noting that conflict in English courts regarding extraterritorial
application of privilege against self-incrimination was not resolved until Parliament
passed Civil Evidence Act, 1968, § 14).
51. McRae, 3 L.R.-Ch. at 84-85. The court in McRae stated that on the basis of
the particular circumstances of the case in King of Two Sicilies, that case had been
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determine the extraterritorial application of the privilege, McRae observed, it is the scope of the privilege, and not the adequacy of the risk of prosecution outside of England, that must
be assessed.52
D. The Self-Incrimination Privilege in U.S. Jurisprudence

1. Extension of the Privilege to All Domestic Prosecutions
The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed various aspects of
the scope of the self-incrimination privilege.53 In 1964, the
Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment against abridgement by the states. 4 The Court
subsequently extended the privilege in Murphy v. Waterfront
correctly decided. Id. at 85. The McRae court noted that in King of Two Sicilies the
defendants merely stated that production of the documents in question would expose
them to prosecution in Sicily. Id. The defendants did not provide to the English
court any information regarding the relevant foreign law on that subject. Id. Therefore, Lord Cranworth correctly found in King of Two Sicilies that the defendants did
not show a real and substantial risk of prosecution in Sicily. Id. The court in McRae
stated, however, that Lord Cranworth's judgment in King of Two Sicilies went beyond
the particular case, by holding that the privilege against self-incrimination does not
apply to the risk of foreign prosecution. Id. In McRae, the court held that the privilege against self-incrimination does protect individuals from testifying when they risk
foreign prosecution. Id. at 87. As Lord Chelmsford stated, "I cannot distinguish the
case in principle from one where a witness is protected from answering any question
which has a tendency to expose him to forfeiture for a breach of our own municipal
law." Id.
52. Id. at 85.
53. See Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 48081 (1972) (noting that substantial fear of non-U.S. prosecution is necessary to present constitutional question); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462 (1972)
(holding that immunity from use of compelled testimony is coextensive with privilege
against self-incrimination and suffices to supplant it); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n
of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 77 (1964) (holding that Fifth Amendment privilege
protects individuals from fear of prosecution in any domestic jurisdiction regardless
of whether testimony is compelled by state or federal government); Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964) (holding that Fifth Amendment privilege was applicable to
states); see also Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 365-66 (1917); Heike v. United
States, 227 U.S. 131, 144 (1913); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599-600 (1896) (all
holding that Fifth Amendment does not protect against remote or speculative possibilities).
54. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 7. The Malloy Court held that both state and federal
governments are "constitutionally compelled to establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured, and may not by coercion prove a charge against an accused
out of his own mouth." Id. at 8.
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Commission of New York Harbor.5" In Murphy, the Court held that
the Fifth Amendment prohibited the government from compelling individuals to testify if such testimony could be used
subsequently against those individuals in either federal or state
prosecutions. 5 6 Previously, individuals could invoke the 'selfincrimination privilege only when they feared prosecution in
the same jurisdiction that compelled the testimony.5 7 In expanding the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege, Murphy
analyzed various English court decisions that allowed the privilege to protect against the risk of foreign prosecution, as well
as the policies supporting the privilege.5
In Murphy, the Supreme Court stated that McRae represented the English rule regarding the extraterritorial scope of
the privilege. 59 Endorsing McRae, the Court acknowledged the
English rule that the privilege against self-incrimination should
apply extraterritorially.6 ° As noted earlier, McRae held that the
reasoning of King of Two Sicilies related to the substantiality of
the risk of prosecution as opposed to the scope of the privilege. 6 ' As a result, in Murphy, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled its earlier decision in United States v. Murdock6 2 by adopt55. 378 U.S. 52, 77 (1964); see supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing
significance of Murphy decision).
56. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 77.
57. See Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1958) (holding that state
government could have compelled witness to testify although testimony may have
incriminated that witness under federal law), overruled by Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n of N.Y Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487,
492 (1944) (holding that testimony compelled by state that might incriminate individual under federal law could be introduced into evidence in federal courts), overruled by
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); United States v.
Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 148-49 (1931) (holding that privilege did not protect against
fear of prosecution under state law if federal government compelled testimony), overruled by Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
58. See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 58-63. Murphy discussed the English court decisions
of East India Co., King of Two Sicilies, and McRae to show that the scope of the Fifth
Amendment encompassed the fear of both federal and state prosecution, regardless
of which court compelled the testimony. Id.
59. Id. at 63.
60. Id.
61. See United States v. McRae, [1867] 3 L.R.-Ch. 79, 84-87 (Ch. App.) (overruling part of King of Two Sicilies by holding that decision related to substantiality of fear
of prosecution, not to scope of privilege).
62. 284 U.S. 141 (1931), overruled by Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). In Murdock, the Supreme Court allowed federal courts to
compel testimony that might incriminate a witness under state law and relied on the
English case of King of Two Sicilies as representing the English rule on the extraterri-
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ingMcRae and dismissing King of Two Sicilies as the representative English rule.6 3 The Murphy Court also discussed the early
English case of East India Co. v. Campbell,6 4 which had allowed
the.defendants in England to refuse to testify due to the risk of
incrimination in India.6" Murphy concluded that because English cases supported an extraterritorial application of the privilege, the privilege should protect individuals from testifying in
federal and state courts if they fear prosecution in any domestic jurisdiction.6 6 Although the Murphy decision discussed the
English rule with respect to the extraterritorial scope of the
privilege, the question concerning the application of the Fifth
Amendment to the risk of proceedings outside the United
States was not present in Murphy. 6 7 TheCourt, therefore, did
not discuss whether the Fifth Amendment protects individuals
from testifying when their testimony may incriminate them in
jurisdictions outside the United States.6 8
In assessing the scope of the privilege, however, the Murphy Court did identify many important policies supporting the
right against self-incrimination. 69 The Court stressed that the
privilege protects individuals from governmental abuse and reflects U.S. reluctance to subject a person to the "cruel
trilemma" of choosing among self-accusation, perjury, or contempt. 70 The Court found that extending the privilege to protect against the risk of incrimination in any domestic jurisdiction would promote these Fifth Amendment purposes. 7 1 Murphy concluded that the historical treatment of the privilege, as
well as its underlying purposes, warranted the extension of the
torial scope of the privilege against self-incrimination. Id.at 148. The Murdock Court
stated that King of Two Sicilies did not allow an individual to claim the privilege when
faced with the risk of foreign prosecution. In Murphy, however, the Supreme Court
held that Murdock's reliance on King of Two Sicilies was inapposite. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 57 (1964). Murphy held that McRae, and
not King of Two Sicilies, represented the English rule on the extraterritorial application
of the privilege. Id. at 63.
63. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 57.
64. 27 Eng. Rep. 1010, 1011 (Ex. 1749).
65. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 58.
66. Id.at 77.
67. See id. at 53.
68. See id. at 77.
69. See id. at 55.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 54.
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privilege to protect against the threat of any domestic prosecution.7 2
2. The Supreme Court's Treatment of the Extraterritorial
Reach of the Amendment
The Supreme Court considered, although it did not resolve, the question of the extraterritorial reach of the Fifth
Amendment in Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Commission of Investigation. 73 The Court never resolved the constitutional question
because it found that the defendant failed to show a real and
substantial risk of a non-U.S. prosecution.7 4 Failing to endorse
or reject the extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court left the issue open for future resolution.7 5
One way of addressing the scope of the Fifth Amendment
is to consider the theories underlying the Constitution. The
natural rights and social contract theories yield different implications for the application of constitutional protections to actions of the U.S. government outside the United States. 76 Ac72. Id. at 77.
73. 406 U.S. 472 (1972).
74. Id. at 480.
75. Id. at 481.
76. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (incorporating
natural rights theory by stating that "all men ... are endowed by their Creator with
certain Unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of
Happiness"); Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 556
(Elliot ed. 1987) (criticizing Alien Act, James Madison states that "although aliens are
not parties to the constitution, it does not follow that because aliens are not . . .
parties to the constitution, as citizens are parties to it, that, whilst they actually conform to it, they have no protection under it"). See generally CARL BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE ch. 2 (1960) (comprehensively examining natural rights

theory as embedded in Declaration of Independence and informing U.S. law); EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 9 (1928). Professor Corwin discusses the history and background of the natural
law theory. See Roszell Dulany Hunter, IV, Note, The ExtraterritorialApplication of the
Constitution-UnalienableRights?, 72 VA. L. REV. 649, 651 (1986) (stating that framers
of Constitution incorporated both natural rights and social contract theories).
But see League v. DeYoung, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 184, 202 (1850) (stating Constitution made by and for protection of people of United States); McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404-05 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.) (stating powers of U.S. government are granted by people for their benefit); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2
Dail.) 419, 471 (1793) (Jay, C.J.) (noting that Constitution is compact made by U.S.
citizens to govern themselves in particular mannef); Pauling v. McElroy, 278 F.2d
252, 254 n.3 (D.C. Cir.) (applying social contract theory and stating that non-resident
aliens are not protected by U.S. Constitution), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835 (1960).

1991-1992]

SELF-INCRIMINA TION

cording to the natural rights theory, certain universal principles inform U.S. constitutional law. As a result, constitutional
principles and respect for certain natural rights govern all government activities, regardless of the location in which they occur.7 7 The social contract theory, on the other hand, contends
that the Constitution is a contract which only binds the action
of the U.S. government with respect to U.S. citizens. 78 Accord77. See generally BECKER, supra note 76, ch. 2 (discussing development of natural
rights theory and its important role in Declaration of Independence). See CoRwIN,
supra note 76, at 4-5. Professor Corwin, describing the theory of law embodied in the
U.S. Constitution, states that
[t]here are, it is predicated, certain principles of right and justice which are
entitled to prevail of their own intrinsic excellence, altogether regardless of
the attitude of those who wield the physical resources of the community.
Such principles were made by no human hands; indeed, if they did not antedate deity itself, they still so express its nature as to bind and control it....
They are eternal and immutable. In relation to such principles, human laws
are, when entitled to obedience save as to matters indifferent, merely a record or transcript, and their enactment an act not of will or power but one of
discovery and declaration . .

.

. Thus the legality of the Constitution, its

supremacy, and its claim to be worshipped, alike find common standing
ground on the belief in a law superior to the will of human governs.
Id.; see Jules Lobel, The Constitution Abroad, 83 AM.J. INT'L L. 871, 875 (1989). Professor Lobel states that
[t]he state constitutions and declarations of rights explicitly recognized that
all people have "certain inherent natural rights, of which they cannot, by any
compact, deprive or divest their posterity." Since the parties to the compact
could not waive these rights, for their posterity, the government they would
establish had to respect the rights of all people, irrespective of whether they
were in some metaphysical sense parties to the compact.
Id. at 875-76; see also Note, The ExtraterritorialApplicability of the Fourth Amendment, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1672, 1675 (1989) (stating that natural rights theory views that Constitution inherently constrains acts of U.S. officials, regardless of locale). For cases using this approach, see, e.g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922) ("The
Constitution of the United States is in force.., wherever and whenever the sovereign
power of that government is exerted."); Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745
F.2d 1500, 1544 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) ("All the officers of the government, from
the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it.") (quoting United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 218 (1882)), vacated as moot, 471 U.S. 1113
(1985).
78. See CORWIN, supra note 76, at 61-62. In addition to discussing the development of the natural rights theory, Professor Corwin also discusses the evolution of
the social compact or contract theory. Id. In discussing John Locke's Second Treatise
on Civil Government, Professor Corwin states that
[t]he outstanding feature of Locke's treatment of natural laws is the almost
complete dissolution which this concept undergoes through his handling
into the natural rights of the individual ....The dissolving agency by which

Locke brings this transformation about is the doctrine of the social compact,
with its corollary notion of a state of nature.
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ing to this contract, the people of the United States have a duty
to support the government and the U.S. government has a
duty to conduct its activities as established in the contract.7 9
Although the natural rights theory may overly expand the application of the Constitution, the social contract theory may
improperly limit the protection of the Constitution to U.S. citizens. 80
Courts and commentors have invoked these theories when
assessing the extent of the Constitution's reach to protect

aliens within and outside the United States, as well as the Constitution's authority to limit the activities of the U.S. government abroad. 8 1 These theories, however, may also bear on
whether it is acceptable for the U.S. government to compel testimony in the United States that will be used by a court outside
the United States. As the history of the privilege against selfincrimination indicates, the privilege is grounded in the premise that all people have a natural right not to incriminate themselves.82
Id. at 61. Professor Corwin notes, however, that Locke viewed "natural law [as approximating] to positive law from the first, while even after the establishment of government, popular interpretation of natural law is the ultimate test of validity of civil
law." Id. at 67; see Hunter, supra note 76, at 652 (discussing social contract theories);
Mary Lynn Nicholas, Comment, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez: Restricting the
Borders of the Fourth Amendment, 14 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 267, 270 (1990-1991).

79. CORWIN, supra note 76, at 86-88 (discussing social compact theory); Hunter,
supra note 76, at 652.
80. See Nicholas, supra note 78, at 271 (stating that proponents of social contract
theory criticize natural rights theory because it overly expands Constitution). Proponents of the social contract theory argue that allowing all people to possess natural
rights that the government cannot violate would enable aliens injured by U.S. military operations to bring a cause of action against the U.S. government. See United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273-74 (1990) (discussing problems of
judicially created cause of action).
81. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957) (stating that United States is
entirely creature of Constitution); In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891) (holding that
Constitution has no operation in another country); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 369 (1885) (holding that resident aliens were parties to Constitution and thus
entitled to its protection); Hunter, supra note 76, at 676 (discussing framers' intent to
have Constitution's protection apply to all individuals); Richard Ward, Searching the
World Over: Applying the Exclusionary Rule to Searches of Aliens by U.S. Agents, 7 LAw &

INEQUALITY 489, 501 (1989) (asserting that natural rights theory requires U.S. government to treat all people equally regardless of nationality).
82. See LEVY, supra note 10, at 431. Professor Levy, quoting Justice Abe Fortas,
notes that the state
"has no right to compel the sovereign individual to surrender or impair his
right of self-defense." The fundamental value reflected by the Fifth Amend-
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3. Immunity May Replace the Right Against SelfIncrimination
Although the Supreme Court safeguards the values supporting the privilege against self-incrimination, the Court allows the government to compel testimony when the witness
has received immunity.8 3 The government may only grant immunity, however, if such immunity offers protections co-extensive with the scope of the Fifth Amendment.8 4 If the immunity
is not as comprehensive as the privilege's protection, a defendant may refuse to testify.8"
The Supreme Court has held that immunity from domesment "is intangible, it is true; but so is liberty, and so is man's immortal
soul. A man may be punished, even put to death, by the state; but.., he
should not be made to prostrate himself before its majesty. Mea Culpa belongs to a man and his God. It is a plea that cannot be exacted from free
men by human authority."
Id.
83. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). In Kastigar, the Court confronted the issue of whether "use and derivative use" immunity adequately replaced
the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 443. The defendants argued that
transactional immunity was required to replace their right against self-incrimination.
Id. at 442. "Use and derivative use" immunity protects the individual from the subsequent use of immunized testimony and evidence obtained by using such testimony
against the individual in a criminal prosecution. JOHN KAPLAN ET. AL., EVIDENCE 597
(7th ed. 1992). Transactional immunity protects the witness from prosecution for
those transactions about which the witness testified under immunity. Id. Thus, transactional immunity ensures individuals that the government will not prosecute them
for any offenses that are revealed through their compelled testimony. Id. The Court
in Kastigarheld that transactional immunity would afford broader protection than the
Fifth Amendment privilege and is therefore not constitutionally required. Kastigar,
406 U.S. at 453. The U.S. immunity statute provides for immunity whenever
a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to
testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a
committee or a subcommittee of either House, and the person presiding
over the proceeding communicates to the witness an order issued under this
part, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information
compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived
from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness
in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1988).
84. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 462.
85. Id. at 449.
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tic prosecution provides the same protection as the privilege
because it ensures that the government will not subject the individual to criminal punishment as a result of the use of such
testimony.8 6 The Court finds that such immunity places the
witness in substantially the same position as if the witness had
claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege and, thus, adequately
replaces the amendment's protection.8 7 Many lower courts
hold that immunity, however, cannot protect the individual
from the risk of prosecution in a non-U.S. proceeding.8 8
4. The Real Risk Requirement of the Self-Incrimination
Privilege
Although the Fifth Amendment privilege grants a broad
right against self-incrimination, individuals may only invoke
the privilege once they have established a real and substantial
fear of prosecution.8 9 This fear must be realistic because remote and speculative possibilities do not merit the protection
of the privilege. 90
In In re Flanagan,9 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit developed a five-part test to assess the validity of
an individual's fear of prosecution.9" First, a court must con86. Id. In Kastigar, the Court stated that

[tihe privilege assures that a citizen is not compelled to incriminate himself
by his own testimony. It usually operates to allow a citizen to remain silent
when asked a question requiring an incriminatory answer. [Immunity] ...
affords the same protection by assuring that the compelled testimony can in
no way lead to the infliction of criminal penalties.
Id.

87. Id. at 462.
88. E.g., In re Flanagan, 691 F.2d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 1982).
89. Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 481
(1972) (holding that Fifth Amendment question only exists when defendant shows
real and substantial fear of non-U.S. prosecution).
90. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing cases that held that Fifth
Amendment does not protect against remote possibilities).
91. 691 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1982).
92. Id. The defendant in Flanaganwas subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury
regarding an alleged conspiracy to supply guns to the Irish Republican Army in Ireland. Id. at 118. When Mr. Flanagan invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege, the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted him immunity. In re
Flanagan, 533 F. Supp. 957 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 691 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1982). Mr. Flanagan still refused to testify on the ground that immunity could not protect him from
the use of his testimony by prosecutors in the United Kingdom. Id. at 962. The
district court held that Mr. Flanagan had a real fear of foreign prosecution and that
the Fifth Amendment protected him against this risk. Id. at 965. On appeal, the U.S.

1991-19921

SELF-INCRIMINATION

sider whether the defendant faces an existing or potential nonU.S. prosecution. 93 Second, the court must ascertain the nature of the charges that could be filed against the defendant
outside the United States.94 Third, the court must evaluate
whether the defendant's testimony would initiate or further
such extraterritorial prosecution.9 5 Fourth, the court must assess the possibility that any such charges would cause the defendant's extradition from the United States.96 Finally, the
court must determine the likelihood that the defendant's testimony would be disclosed to a government outside the United
States.9

According to the Second Circuit, courts should evaluate
these five factors in light of several overall considerations.
The defendant's apprehension must be founded on objective
facts, not subjective speculation.9" The defendant must make a
"particularized showing" that her testimony may incriminate
her outside the United States. 99 In addition, if an individual
has received immunity from domestic punishment in exchange
for testimony,100 that individual must make a stronger showing
of a real risk of non-U.S. prosecution.' 0 ' Many courts employ
Flanagan'sfive-part test to ascertain the validity of the witness's
risk of non-U.S. prosecution. 0 2 Because the Flanagan test analyzes many factors to determine the substantiality of the risk of
such prosecution, courts are able to determine the precise naCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit did not consider the Fifth Amendment issue.
Flanagan, 691 F.2d at 124. However, it reversed the district court on the ground that
Mr. Flanagan did not show a real fear of incrimination under non-U.S. law. Id. Because the Court found that Mr. Flanagan did not have a substantial fear of non-U.S.
prosecution, he could not invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege. Id.
93. Flanagan, 691 F.2d at 121.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1988) (setting forth general requirements for granting of immunity).
101. In re Flanagan, 691 F.2d 116, 121 (2d Cir. 1982). The court held that the
extensive scope of immunity narrows the risk of incrimination. Id.
102. See, e.g., Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052,
1064-65 (3d Cir. 1988), aff'd, 493 U.S. 400 (1990); United States v.Joudis, 800 F.2d
159, 162 (7th Cir. 1986); In re President's Comm'n on Organized Crime, 763 F.2d
1191, 1199 (11 th Cir. 1985).
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ture of the witness's claim.
In cases involving grand jury proceedings, however, some
courts do not employ Flanagan'stest, but instead rely on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) ("Rule 6(e)"). 11 4 Rule
6(e) prohibits the disclosure of grand jury testimony except
under certain circumstances. 0 5 Disclosure may be made only
to a government attorney for use in the performance of duty,
to government personnel aiding a government attorney in the
performance of duty, when directed by a court, and when
103. Joudis, 800 F.2d at 162.
104. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) [hereinafter Rule 6(e)]. Rule 6(e) sets out the requirements of secrecy in grand jury proceedings. Id. Because this rule strictly limits
the disclosure of grand jury testimony, it may adequately protect against the fear that
non-U.S. governments will receive such testimony. See In re Parker, 411 F.2d 1067,
1069 (10th Cir. 1969) (holding that Rule 6(e) adequately protects against fear of
prosecution outside United States), vacated as moot, 397 U.S. 96 (1970). Rule 6(e)
provides in pertinent part that
any person to whom disclosure is made ... shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules.
No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule....
(3) Exceptions.
(A) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before
the grand jury, other than its deliberations and the vote of any grand juror,
may be made to(i) an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such attorney's duty; and
(ii) such government personnel ... as are deemed necessary by an attorney
for the government to assist an attorney for the government in the performance of such attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal law. ...
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before
the grand jury may also be made(i) when so directed by a court preliminary to or in connection with a judicial proceeding;
(ii) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant, upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of
matters occurring before the grand jury;
(iii) when the disclosure is made by an attorney for the government to another federal grand jury; or
(iv) when permitted by a court at the request of an attorney for the government, upon a showing that such matters may disclose a violation of state
criminal law, to an appropriate official of a state or subdivision of a state for
the purpose of enforcing such law.
If the court orders disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury, the
disclosure shall be made in such manner, at such time, and under such conditions as the court may direct.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
105. FED. R. CkIM. P. 6(e)(3) (setting forth exceptions to general rule of secrecy
regarding disclosure of grand jury proceedings).
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Because of the secrecy provided by Rule 6(e), courts frequently find in grand jury cases that individuals have failed to
show a real and substantial risk of prosecution outside the
United States and thus lose their right to remain silent.' 0 7 Individuals often receive immunity to compel them to testify
before a grand jury. 0 8 Some of these individuals, however,
also claim to face prosecution outside the United States.'0 9
Because they risk prosecution outside the United States, many
of these individuals attempt to invoke the self-incrimination
privilege despite their immunity from U.S. prosecution. 0
Courts that employ the Rule 6(e) argument find that witnesses claiming the privilege have sufficient protection from
the threat of non-U.S. prosecution because the U.S. govern106. See id.

107. See Nigro v. United States, 705 F.2d 1224, 1228 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding
that Rule 6(e) eliminates any real fear of non-U.S. prosecution, but protective measures are needed to ensure secrecy of grand jury testimony), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 927
(1983); In re Baird, 668 F.2d 432, 434 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that secrecy requirements of grand jury testimony causes witness's risk of foreign prosecution to be remote and speculative); United States v. Brummitt, 665 F.2d 521, 525-26 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 977 (1982); In re Tierney, 465 F.2d 806, 810 (5th Cir.
1972); In re Weir, 377 F. Supp. 919, 924 (S.D. Cal.), aff'd, 495 F.2d 879 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1038 (1974) (each holding that witnesses did not show real fear
of non-U.S. prosecution because of secrecy requirements of grand jury testimony
under Rule 6(e)); see also Moshe M. Sukenik, Note, Testimony Incriminating Under the
Laws of a Foreign Country--Is There a Right to Remain Silent?, 11 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.

359, 379 (1978) (stating that evaluating substantiality of individual's fear of non-U.S.
prosecution has been addressed often in context of grand jury proceedings).
108. See, e.g., In re Chevrier, 748 F.2d 100 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Flanagan, 691
F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1982); Baird, 668 F.2d at 432; Tierney, 465 F.2d at 808; Parker, 411
F.2d at 1069; Weir, 377 F. Supp. at 922; In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Conn.
1972) (all noting cases in which defendants were offered immunity in exchange for
testifying before grand jury).
109. Chevrier, 748 F.2d at 101; Flanagan,691 F.2d at 119; Baird, 668 F.2d at 433;
Tierney, 465 F.2d at 811; In re Parker, 411 F.2d 1067 (10th Cir. 1969), vacated as moot,
397 U.S. 96.(1970); Weir, 377 F. Supp. at 924; Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. at 1082 (each
addressing cases in which defendants, despite grant of immunity, refused to testify
before grand jury by invoking self-incrimination privilege, claiming fear of prosecution outside United States)..
110.' See Sukenik, supra note 107, at 379 (stating that question regarding sufficiency of individual's fear of prosecution outside United States often arises in grand
jury proceedings); see also Nigro, 705 F.2d at 1228 (10th Cir. 1982); Baird, 668 F.2d at
433; Brummitt, 665 F.2d at 525; Tierney, 465 F.2d at 811; Weir, 377 F. Supp. at 922 (all
concerning cases in which defendant claimed right against self-incrimination privilege, despite grant of immunity from domestic prosecution, because of alleged feared
prosecution outside United States).
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ment cannot violate grand jury secrecy under Rule 6(e) without a court order."' By ordering disclosure, courts would defeat the purpose of grand jury secrecy as well as the courts'
promise of immunity.' t2 Therefore, these courts assume that a
district court that has granted a witness immunity will not subI3
sequently order the disclosure of that witness's testimony. ,
II.THE UNCERTAIN TREATMENT OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE BY THE LOWER
COURTS
Various lower courts disagree with respect to the application of the Fifth Amendment privilege to testimony that may
be used against an individual in a prosecution outside the
United States." 4 Some lower courts have extended the privilege by holding that the policies supporting the Fifth Amendment and the history ofjudicial treatment of the privilege support its extraterritorial application.'
Other lower courts, in
contrast, have refused to extend the privilege, stressing that an
111. Baird, 668 F.2d at 434; Brummitt, 665 F.2d at 525; Tierney, 465 F.2d at 810.
112. E.g., In re Tierney, 465 F.2d 806, 810 (5th Cir. 1972); see Parker, 411 F.2d
1067 (holding that Rule 6(e)'s requirements eliminated fear of disclosure of testimony to non-U.S. governments).
113. In re Baird, 668 F.2d 432, 434 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Brummitt,
665 F.2d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 977 (1982); Tierney, 465 F.2d
at 811. Despite the exceptions in Rule 6(e) that allow grand jury testimony to be
disclosed under certain circumstances, the courts held that the rule adequately protected the witnesses against the fear of foreign prosecution. Baird, 668 F.2d at 434;
Brummitt, 665 F.2d at 525; Tierney, 465 F.2d at 811. Other courts urge that additional
protective measures should be employed to ensure the secrecy of grand jury testimony under Rule 6(e). Nigro v. United States, 705 F.2d 1224, 1228 (10th Cir. 1982)
(holding that Rule 6(e) eliminates any real fear of non-U.S. prosecution, but protective measures were needed to ensure secrecy of grand jury testimony), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 927 (1983); see United States v. Joudis, 800 F.2d 159 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding
that district court adequately protected defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege by
requiring deposition put under seal).
114. Compare Moses v. Allard, 779 F. Supp. 857, 882-83 (E.D. Mich. 1991) and
Mishima v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 131, 135 (D. Alaska 1981) and In re Cardassi,
351 F. Supp. 1080, 1086 (D. Conn. 1972) (all extending Fifth Amendment to protect
against threat of non-U.S. prosecution) with United States v. (Under Seal), 794 F.2d
920, 925 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 924 (1986) and In re Parker, 411 F.2d
1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 1969), vacated as moot, 397 U.S. 96 (1970) and Phoenix Assurance Co. of Can. v. Runck, 317 N.W.2d 402, 413 (N.D.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 862
(1982) (all holding Fifth Amendment privilege does not apply when risk of prosecution arises outside United States).
115. Moses, 779 F. Supp. at 872-73; Mishima, 507 F. Supp. at 135; United States
v. Trucis, 89 F.R.D. 671, 673 (E.D. Pa. 1981); United States v. Kowalchuk, No. 77-
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extraterritorial application1 6 may frustrate the government's
ability to grant immunity.'
A. Extension of the Privilege to the Risk of Non-U.S. Prosecution
Several lower courts have extended the self-incrimination
privilege to protect individuals from unwillingly providing testimony that might be used against them outside the United
States." 7 These courts stressed the fundamental values behind the Fifth Amendment privilege and looked to the
Supreme Court's decision in Murphy to support their extrater-8
ritorial application of the right against self-incrimination.''
These courts state that the interests protected by the right
against self-incrimination outweigh any potential burden that
an extraterritorial application of the privilege would have on
law enforcement practices." 9
118 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 1978) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Cardassi, 351 F. Supp.
at 1086.
116. See, e.g., Runck, 317 N.W.2d at 413.
117. Moses, 779 F. Supp. at 872-73; Mishima, 507 F. Supp. at 135; Trucis, 89
F.R.D. at 673; Kowalchuk, slip op.; Cardassi,351 F. Supp. at 1086; see supra note 5 and
accompanying text (discussing factual background of Moses).
In Mishima, five Japanese seamen refused to testify, claiming that their testimony
could incriminate them underJapanese law. Mishima, 507 F. Supp. at 132. The court
held that two of the defendants presented a real fear of Japanese prosecution and
could invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. at 135. It stated that the rationale
underlying the Murphy decision clearly applies to risk of non-U.S. prosecution. Id.
Cardassi, which was decided in 1972, has been followed frequently by several
courts. See, e.g., Trucis, 89 F.R.D. at 673; Kowalchuk, slip op. (following reasoning of
Judge Newman in In re Cardassi); supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing
background of Cardassi); see also In re Letters Rogatory from 9th Criminal Div. Regional, Mannheim F.R.G., 448 F. Supp. 786 (S.D. Fla. 1978) (holding that Fifth
Amendment protected against witness's fear of prosecution pending in West Germany).
The court in Letters Rogatory found a strong need to protect citizens from unjust
infringements of their constitutional rights. Id. at 790; see United States v. Kirsteins,
No. 87-CV-964, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5183 (N.D.N.Y. May 10, 1989) (holding Fifth
Amendment privilege in denaturalization proceeding protects against threat of nonU.S. prosecution); Yves Farms, Inc. v. Rickett, 659 F. Supp. 932,940 (M.D. Ga. 1987)
(holding that self incrimination privilege allowed plaintiff in civil action to refuse to
answer questions that could incriminate him under non-U.S. law); Kowalchuk, slip op.
(adopting Cardassi'sreasoning that self-incrimination privilege applies to fear of prosecution outside United States).
118. Moses, 779 F. Supp. at 878; Mishima, 507 F. Supp. at 134-35; Cardassi,351 F.
Supp. at 1084.
119. See, e.g., In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080, 1086 (D. Conn. 1972) (stating
that constitutional privileges do not disappear or lose vitality simply because they
may hinder law enforcement activities).
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In extending the privilege extraterritorially, many courts
conclude that, because Murphy relied on the English cases extending the privilege extraterritorially, the Supreme Court recognized that the scope of the privilege should include the
threat of non-U.S. prosecution. 20 According to these courts,
nothing in Murphy's rationale demonstrates an intention to
limit the Court's reasoning to the domestic state-federal context.' 2 ' As a result, these courts hold that the Murphy decision
warrants the extension of the privilege to the threat of nonU.S. prosecution. 2 2
In extending the privilege against self-incrimination to
protect against the risk of non-U.S. prosecution, the court in
Moses v. Allard examined the underlying purposes of the privilege.1 23 The Fifth Amendment privilege evolved from a belief
in the fundamental unfairness of compelled self-incrimination.' 24 Moses stressed that the policies behind the privilege
consistently involve the fear of governmental abuse. 2 5 The
court held that governmental abuse occurs by compelling individuals to testify against themselves, regardless of the location
of the feared prosecution. 2 6 If the right against self-incrimination did not extend to the risk of non-U.S. prosecution, the
policies underlying the privilege would be defeated.' 27 Moses
120. See Moses v. Allard, 779 F. Supp. 857, 878 (E.D. Mich 1991); Mishima v.
United States, 507 F. Supp. 131, 134-35 (D. Ala. 1981); United States v. Trucis, 89
F.R.D. 671, 672 (E.D. Pa. 1981); United States v. Kowalchuk, No. 77-118 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 20, 1978) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. at 1084 (all
holding that Murphy rationale supports extension of privilege extraterritorially); see
also supra note 1 and accompanying text (explaining background of Murphy decision).
121. Moses, 779 F. Supp. at 878.
122. Id.; Mishima, 507 F. Supp. at 135; Trucis, 89 F.R.D. at 672; Kowalchuk, slip
op.; Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. at 1085. Contra Capra, supra note 50 (stating that discussion of English rule in Murphy was merely an argument for weakness of precedent).
123. Moses, 779 F. Supp. at 882 (holding that history, policies, and language of
Fifth Amendment privilege support its extension to protect against threat of nonU.S. prosecution).
124.Id. at 871; see LEVY, supra note 10, at 432. The court in Moses stated that
[i]t was th[e] persecution of the individual by the church that seemed to
serve as the catalyst for the formation of the privilege. The privilege, then,
sprang not from a specific right granted under law, but from a belief in the
fundamental unfairness of a court's compelling a citizen to answer questions
designed to accuse that citizen of a crime.
Moses, 779 F. Supp. at 871.
125. Moses v. Allard, 779 F. Supp. 857, 873-74 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
126. Id.
127. Id.
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also found that the language of the amendment depicts the
framers' intent to establish a criminal justice system based on
fair procedures.' 28 The court emphasized the framers' belief
that creating a fair system in which individuals made no unwilling contribution to their convictions was more valuable than
punishing the guilty.' 29 Such a system must logically extend
Fifth Amendment protections to the risk of prosecution
3
outside the United States.' 1
In In re Trucis and In re Cardassi, U.S. District Courts for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the District of Connecticut extended the privilege stressing that a basic purpose of the
Fifth Amendment is to restrict the actions of the U.S. government. Therefore, these courts held that the Amendment
should restrict these actions regardless of the location of the
threatened prosecution.' 3' In Trucis, the court stated that
although the right against self-incrimination focuses on limiting the activities of governmental entities, it also supplies 3 a2
freedom for all people under the protection of U.S. law.1
128. Id. at 874.
129. Id. Although the privilege protects individuals from becoming witnesses
against themselves, limitations of the privilege do exist. As previously mentioned,
the privilege does not protect against remote or speculative possibilities of prosecution. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). In addition, the privilege
protects individuals only from being compelled to testify against themselves or providing evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature. Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966). It does not apply to evidence of acts that are noncommunicative in nature, even though such acts are compelled in order to obtain testimony of others. Id. at 764-65.
130. Moses v. Allard, 779 F. Supp. 857, 874 (E.D. Mich. 1991). Moses stated that
[it] is this court's firm conviction that the Fifth Amendment, in both language and intent, was meant to inhere in the individual and to be available
to the individual to protect against unlawful compulsion by any government,
regardless of the fortuitous nature of the jurisdiction involved. The Court
reaches this view, in great measure, by the very language of the Amendment
itself. The entire focus of the language of the privilege, as set forth in the
Amendment, is upon the individual and his fundamental right to be free
from governmental overreaching and excess.
Id.

131. United States v. Trucis, 89 F.R.D. 671, 673 (E.D. Pa. 1981); In re Cardassi,
351 F. Supp. 1080, 1085 (D. Conn. 1972) (both holding that Fifth Amendment rights
should not be limited by location of threatened prosecution).
132. Trucis, 89 F.R.D. at 673 (noting that self-incrimination privilege provides
freedom for people under U.S. law and therefore should extend extraterritorially).
The court adopted the reasoning of Cardassi,which held that Murphy's discussion of
English cases warrants extension of the privilege to the fear of non-U.S. prosecution.
Id; see Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. at 1086.
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The court in Cardassinoted that most protections in the Bill of
Rights place potential burdens on law enforcement officials
and that the desire to protect individual rights justifies this
consequence. 3 3 Furthermore, Cardassi recognized that prosecutors could avoid this burden by framing their questions to
avoid invoking the risk of incrimination.134
B. Limiting the Privilege to Threats of Domestic Prosecution
Other lower courts hold that the privilege against self-incrimination should not extend to the risk of prosecution
outside the United States. 3 5 Some courts that limit the privilege dismiss the significance of Murphy's reliance on the English cases. 1 36 In In re Parker,'37 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
133. Cardassi,351 F. Supp. at 1086; see Trucis, 89 F.R.D. at 673 (stating that privilege does not only limit law enforcement activities but also confers freedom on individuals within United States).
134. Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. at 1086. In addition, a concurring opinion in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit case of In re Lemieux also stated that the
self-incrimination privilege protects against non-U.S. prosecution. In re Lemieux,
597 F.2d 1166, 1167 (9th Cir. 1979) (Hufstedler, J., concurring). Although the majority opinion held that Rule 6(e) eliminated.the witness's fear of non-U.S. prosecution, the concurring opinion by Judge Hufstedler addressed the constitutional issue.
Id. The majority followed the holding of In re Weir. Id.; see In re Weir, 377 F. Supp.
919 (S.D. Cal.) (holding that Rule 6(e) disposes of any real fear of non-U.S. prosecution), aff'd, 495 F.2d 879 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1038 (1974). Judge Hufstedler's concurrence stated that the privilege should extend to the threat of nonU.S. prosecution. Lemieux, 597 F.2d at 1169 (Hufstedler, J., concurring). She
adopted the reasoning of the court in Cardassi. Id.; see Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080.
Judge Hufstedler stated that the immunity granted to the witness was not co-extensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege because the witness could be subjected to
non-U.S. prosecution. Lemieux, 597 F.2d at 1169 (Hufstedler,J., concurring). Therefore, the court should not compel the witness to testify. Id. Judge Hufstedler also
stated that Rule 6(e) did not sufficiently eliminate a witness's fear of incrimination in
another country. Id. He concurred, however, because the court was under the compulsion of In re Weir, 495 F.2d 879 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1038 (1974).
135. See, e.g., United States v. (Under Seal), 794 F.2d 920 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 924 (1986); In re Parker, 411 F.2d 1067 (10th Cir. 1969), vacated as moot, 397
U.S. 96 (1970); Phoenix Assurance Co. of Can. v. Runck, 317 N.W. 2d 402 (N.D.)
(holding that Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination does not protect
against threat of non-U.S. prosecution), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 862 (1982); see also
R.D.G., supra note 28, at 876 (arguing that Fifth Amendment should not prohibit U.S.
government from compelling testimony that non-U.S. prosecutors might use); Capra,
supra note 50 (finding that Fifth Amendment does not protect witness from risk of
non-U.S. prosecution).
136. See, e.g., Parker, 411 F.2d at 1070; Runck, 317 N.W. 2d at 411 (both dismissing significance of Murphy's reliance on English cases extending self-incrimination privilege extraterritorially); see also Capra, supra note 50.
137. 411 F.2d 1067 (10th Cir. 1969), vacated as moot, 397 U.S. 96 (1970).
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the Tenth Circuit stated that the Supreme Court employed
English case law in Murphy only as an "argumentative analogy"
to help interpret the scope of the privilege in a federal-state
context.

38

39
Also, in Phoenix Assurance Co. of Canada v. Runck,'

the Supreme Court of North Dakota dismissed the significance
of the English cases on the basis of Justice Harlan's concurrence in Murphy.'" ° The court in Runck interpreted Justice
Harlan's concurrence as stating that some of the cases cited by
the majority involved prosecution in English colonies and thus
were not truly extraterritorial. 4 ' The court opined that because these cases dealt with English colonies they did not represent a true extraterritorial application of the privilege.
Therefore, the courts in Parker and Runck asserted that the
English cases are not persuasive in determining the extraterri42
torial reach of the Fifth Amendment.
In limiting the protection of the privilege to the risk of
domestic prosecution, the court in Parker stressed that the Fifth
Amendment should not protect individuals from incriminating
43
themselves for acts that are not crimes in the United States.

Parkerheld that allowing the Fifth Amendment to protect individuals against self-incrimination for an act that is not criminal
in the United States would frustrate the purpose of the Fifth
Amendment. 14 4 The Parker court also held that Rule 6(e) adequately prevents disclosure of the witness's testimony to non138. See id. at 1070.
139. 317 N.W.2d 402, 411 (N.D.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 862 (1982).
140. Id. at 411.
141. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 81 n.1
(1964) (Harlan,J., concurring) (stating that English cases decided before U.S. Constitution was drafted, which were cited by majority in Murphy, dealt with jurisdictions
that were controlled by England at that time).
142. In re Parker, 411 F.2d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 1969), vacated as moot, 397 U.S.
96 (1970); Runck, 317 N.W.2d at 411.
143. See Parker, 411 F.2d at 1070 (holding that unfairness would result if Fifth
Amendment extended to fear of non-U.S. prosecution because it would protect
against acts that may not be considered criminal in United States).
144. Id. In Parker, the court stated that
the ideology of some nations considers failure itself to be a crime and could
provide punishment for the failure, apprehension, or admission of a traitorous saboteur acting for such a nation within the United States. In such a
case the words "privilege against self-incrimination," engraved in our history and law as they are, may turn sour when triggered by the law of a foreign nation.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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U.S. governments because it forbids disclosure of grand jury
45
testimony except under certain circumstances.
The court in Runck refused to apply the privilege extrater-

ritorially, reasoning that such an extension would frustrate the
government's ability to compel testimony through grants of
immunity. 14 6 In Runck, the court stated that non-U.S. law
47
should not prevail over the needs of the U.S. government.
In addition, the court held that because the language of the
amendment does not mention non-U.S. law, the framers did
not intend it to apply to risk of non-U.S. prosecution. 4 '
In United States v. (Under Seal), 149 the court limited the
scope of the privilege to the risk of domestic prosecution,
holding that the privilege against self-incrimination applies
only when both the sovereign compelling the testimony and
the sovereign using the testimony must abide by the Fifth
Amendment.' 5 Thus, Under Seal held that an individual may
only invoke the privilege when this "dual sovereignty" exists.'
The court in Under Seal reasoned that the Murphy decision was simply a logical consequence of the Supreme Court's
previous holding in Malloy v. Hogan. 15 2 In Malloy, the Court
145. See id. at 1069.
146. See Phoenix Assurance Co. of Can. v. Runck, 317 N.W.2d 402, 412 (N.D.)
(stating that extension of privilege extraterritorially will frustrate government practice of granting of immunity), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 862 (1982).
147. Id.
148. See id. (holding that language of Amendment supports limited scope of selfincrimination privilege).
149. 794 F.2d 920, 925 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 924 (1986).
150. See id.
(holding that self-incrimination privilege only applies when both sovereign compelling testimony and sovereign using testimony are restricted by Fifth
Amendment). In Under Seal, the witnesses feared prosecution in another country that
was not governed by the Fifth Amendment. Id. Accordingly, the court held that the
witnesses could not invoke the privilege in the United States. Id. at 928.
151. Id. at 926. The author of this Note uses the phrase "dual sovereignty" to
describe the holding of some courts that the right against self-incrimination only applies where both the sovereign compelling the testimony and the sovereign using the
testimony are constrained by the Fifth Amendment.
152. See id. at 927; see also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964) (holding that
Fifth Amendment applies to states); supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing
Malloy). United States v. (Under Seal) involved the Aranetas' refusal to testify before a
grand jury. Under Seal, 794 F.2d at 921. The Aranetas, Philippine citizens, were the
daughter and son-in-law of Ferdinand E. Marcos, former president of the Philippines.
Id. The court held that the secrecy of grand jury proceedings did not eliminate the
Aranetas' fear of Philippine prosecution. Id. at 925. The court found, however, that
the Fifth Amendment privilege did not protect against such fears. Id.
The defendants in this case later applied to the Supreme Court for an applica-
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held that the Fifth Amendment applied to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 3 Once the Fifth Amendment
applied to the states, the Supreme Court held in Murphy that
the self-incrimination privilege protected against the threat of
any domestic prosecution. 154 Under Seal held, therefore, that
the right against self-incrimination does not apply when the
U.S. government compels the testimony and 55a country not
governed by the privilege uses the testimony.'
III. THE FIFTHAMENDMENT SHOULD APPLY TO THE
RISK OF EXTRA TERRITORIAL PROSECUTION
The privilege against self-incrimination should protect individuals from unwillingly providing testimony that may be
used against them in jurisdictions outside the United States.
The policies and purposes behind the amendment will be defeated if the privilege does not extend to all real and substantial fears of prosecution, regardless of location.' 56 Although
grants of immunity adequately replace the privilege against
self-incrimination when individuals risk domestic prosecution,
immunity does not afford the same protection when individuals risk prosecution outside the United States. 5 7 Moreover,
tion to stay the district court's contempt order. See Araneta v. United States, 478 U.S.
1301 (1986) (Burger, CJ.) (granting defendants' application to stay district court's
contempt order). ChiefJustice Burger granted the stay, holding that it was reasonably probable that four justices would grant certiorari. ChiefJustice Burger further
stated that a majority of the court would most likely resolve the issue in favor of the
defendants. He found that the dictum contained in Murphy warranted extending the
privilege to the risk of non-U.S. prosecutions. The Supreme Court, however, subsequently denied certiorari. See Araneta v. United States, 479 U.S. 924 (1986) (denying
Araneta's petition for certiorari with three justices voting to grant certiorari).
153. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 8.
154. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 78-79
(1964) (holding that one jurisdiction in U.S. federal system may not compel witness
to give testimony which might incriminate that witness under laws of another domestic jurisdiction); Malloy, 378 U.S. at 8 (holding that privilege against self-incrimination is protected by Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement by states); see also
supra note 1 (explaining relationship between Murphy and Malloy decisions).
155. United States v (Under Seal), 794 F.2d 920, 925 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 924 (1986).
156. See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55 (discussing policies behind privilege against selfincrimination and their application to protect individuals from risk of any domestic
prosecution); Moses v. Allard, 779 F. Supp. 857, 874 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (holding that
policies behind Fifth Amendment privilege would be defeated if it were limited to
fear of domestic prosecution).
157. See In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080, 1082 (D. Conn. 1972) (holding that
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the secrecy requirements set out in Rule 6(e) do not sufficiently safeguard against the possible disclosure of grand jury
testimony to nations other than the United States.' 5 8 Therefore, an individual who faces prosecution in another country is
subject to a risk of prosecution as strong as if that person faced
domestic prosecution. Such an individual should receive full
Fifth Amendment protection.
A. The Treatment of the Privilege in the Lower Courts Supports an
ExtraterritorialExtension of the Privilege
An analysis of lower court decisions that have addressed
the Fifth Amendment's extraterritorial scope indicates that the
privilege should protect individuals from the risk of prosecution outside the United States. The courts that extend the
Fifth Amendment privilege extraterritorially correctly assess
that the policies behind the privilege support such an extension.' - 9 In addition, these courts properly find that the possible burden such an extension would cause law enforcement activities does not warrant limiting the right against self-incrimination. 60 The courts that limit the privilege to domestic
prosecutions misinterpret the language of the amendment as
well as the reasoning of Murphy. 16 ' Nor do these courts present persuasive reasons for stripping individuals of their right
62
against self-incrimination.
judicial control that forbids use of compelled testimony after person is granted immunity is absent when person fears that testimony will be used in prosecution outside
United States).
158. Id. at 1082-83.
159. See, e.g., Moses, 779 F. Supp. at 874; United States v. Trucis, 89 F.R.D. 671,
673 (E.D. Pa. 1981); see also Fausett, supra note 14, at 720-21 (stating that policy of
cruel trilemma applies when individual faces risk of prosecution in foreign country).
160. See, e.g., Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. at 1086 (noting that frustration of law enforcement practices does not warrant limiting privilege against self-incrimination to
risk of domestic prosecution).
161. See United States v. (Under Seal), 794 F.2d 920, 926 (4th Cir.) (limiting
privilege against self-incrimination to protect against risk of domestic prosecution),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 924 (1986); In re Parker, 411 F.2d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 1969)
(same), vacated as moot, 397 U.S. 96 (1970); Phoenix Assurance Co. of Can. v. Runck,
317 N.W.2d 402, 413 (N.D.) (same), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 862 (1982).
162. See Under Seal, 794 F.2d at 925 (limiting Fifth Amendment privilege because
privilege should only apply where government compelling testimony and government using testimony are both restrained by Fifth Amendment privilege); Parker, 411
F.2d at 1070 (limiting Fifth Amendment privilege because extension would permit
Fifth Amendment to protect against acts that may not constitute crime in United
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Frustration of law enforcement efforts does not constitute
sufficient reason to limit the scope of the privilege to domestic
prosecutions. 6 3 To invoke the privilege against self-incrimination successfully, a witness must satisfy the strong threshold
requirement of proving a substantial risk of non-U.S. prosecution.'"
Due to this requirement, inconvenience to law enforcement officials will occur only where a witness clearly faces
extradition to, and prosecution in, another country.' 65 An individual's right against self-incrimination outweighs any poten66
tial burden to law enforcement officials.'
In addition, the argument that extending the amendment
would enable it to protect acts that are not U.S. crimes fails to
support a limitation of the privilege to domestic prosecution. 16 7 This reasoning would support the application of the
Fifth Amendment privilege to acts committed outside the
United States that constitute crimes within the United
States. 68 Although in some instances a conflict may exist beStates); Runck, 317 N.W.2d at 411 (holding that silence of Fifth Amendment on subject of non-U.S. law shows framers' intent to limit scope of privilege).
163. See In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp 1080, 1086 (D. Conn. 1972) (holding that
burden to law enforcement officials does not outweigh rights protected by self-incrimination privilege).
164. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing cases holding that Fifth
Amendment does not protect against remote or speculative possibilities).
165. See In re Flanagan, 691 F.2d 116, 121 (2d Cir. 1982). According to the
Second Circuit and other courts, individuals must face the possibility that the foreign
charges may subject them to extradition in order to establish that a substantial risk of
foreign prosecution exists. Id.; see also Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick,
Inc., 847 F.2d 1052, 1064-65 (3rd Cir. 1988) (analyzing whether extradition to foreign country in which claimant of privilege risked prosecution was likely), aft'd, 493
U.S. 400 (1990); United States v. Joudis, 800 F.2d 159, 162 (7th Cir. 1986) (same);
United States v. (Under Seal), 794 F.2d 920, 923 (4th Cir. 1986) (same), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 924 (1986); In re President's Comm'n on Organized Crime, 763 F.2d 1191,
1198-99 (11 th Cir. 1985) (same).
166. Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. at 1086 (holding that constitutional privilege does
not disappear, nor lose its vitality, because its use may hinder law enforcement activities).
167. See In re Parker, 411 F.2d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 1969) (holding that an
extension of the privilege to extraterritorial prosecutions would enable the privilege
to protect against acts that are not criminal in the United States), vacated as moot, 397
U.S. 96 (1970).
168. See United States v. Kowalchuk, No. 77-118 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 1978)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). The court in Kowalchuk criticized the Parker court's
assertion that the privilege should not protect against non-U.S. crimes. It stated that
[w]ith deference, I find this reasoning totally unpersuasive. At most, it
would support a ruling limiting availability of the Fifth Amendment protec-
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tween the, criminal laws of the United States and the laws of
other nations, this conflict does not justify a denial of the protection of the privilege in instances where no such conflict exists.' 6 9
Moreover, individuals do not possess a real risk of nonU.S. prosecution unless they face the possibility of extradition
from the United States.' 70 Most U.S. extradition treaties only
allow extradition if the crime is punishable under the laws of
both signatories to the particular treaty.' 7' A person does not
face the possibility of extradition, and thus does not possess a
real risk of prosecution, unless the crime is punishable under
both the laws of the United States and the laws of the country
where prosecution is feared. 72 Therefore, an extraterritorial
extension of the Fifth Amendment privilege would not cause
the privilege to protect against acts that do not constitute U.S.
crimes.

173

In addition, the language of the Fifth Amendment, which
states that a person shall not be forced to incriminate himself
in "any criminal case" supports an extension of the privilege to
tion to the revelation of conduct which, if committed within the United
States, would be criminal under our laws. Surely the fact that there may be a
conflict between the criminal laws of this country and the criminal laws of
the foreign country does not justify denial of the privilege against self-incrimination in cases where there is no such conflict.
Id. Kowalchuk concerned denaturalization cases in which the defendants refused to
answer deposition questions. Id. The court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege
protects against the fear of foreign prosecution. Id.
169. Id. (holding that conflict between penal laws of United States and other
countries does not justify denial of protection of privilege against self-incrimination
in situations where no such conflict exists).
170. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text (discussing Flanagan test that
requires defendant to face possibility of extradition to a non-U.S. country in order to
claim real fear of prosecution in that country).
171. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the
United Mexican States, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059; Treaty on Extradition Between the United States of America and Canada, June 28, 1974-July 9, 1974,
U.S.-Can., 27 U.S.T. 983; Extradition Between the United States of America and
Australia, May 14, 1974, U.S.-Austl., 27 U.S.T. 957; Extradition Treaty Between the
Government of United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, June 8, 1972-Oct. 21, 1976, U.S.-U.K.,
28 U.S.T. 227; Treaty on Extradition Between the United States of America and the
Republic of Argentina, Jan. 21, 1972, U.S.-Arg., 23 U.S.T. 3501; see also Sukenik,
supra note 107, at 369 (stating that U.S. extradition treaties require that extraditable
crime be punishable under laws of both parties to treaty).
172. Sukenik, supra note 107, at 369.
173. Id. at 369-70.
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the risk of extraterritorial prosecution. 74 Because the language of the amendment stresses that it applies to "any criminal case," the framers cannot be said to have intended to limit
its protection to merely domestic criminal cases. The text
more reasonably suggests that the drafters instead intended
the privilege to apply to any criminal case, regardless of its location.' 7 5 The language chosen for the amendment suggests
that the framers intended the amendment to encompass the
76 .
broadest possible formulation of the privilege.
Furthermore, the privilege concerns an individual's right
to be free from compelled self-incrimination.' 77 Thus, the
main focus of the privilege should be on the jurisdiction that
compels the testimony because, by compelling the testimony,
that jurisdiction will violate the claimant's rights. 7 8 The location and governmental policies of the sovereign using the testimony should be irrelevant. Contrary to Under Seal's holding,

therefore, the invocation of the right against self-incrimination
should not depend on whether both the government compelling the testimony and the government 7using
the testimony are
9
Amendment.1
Fifth
the
by
constrained
In addition, Under Seal's "dual sovereignty" holding cre174. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Phoenix Assurance Co. of Can. v. Runck, 317
N.W.2d 402, 411 (N.D.) (holding that Fifth Amendment is silent on subject of nonU.S. law and that therefore framers did not intend it to protect against fear of prosecution outside United States), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 862 (1982).
175. See Moses v. Allard, 779 F. Supp. 857, 874 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (holding that
language of Fifth Amendment supports extension of self-incrimination privilege to
fear of non-U.S. prosecution).
176. See Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955) (stating that "to apply
the privilege narrowly or begrudgingly-to treat it as an historical relic, at most
merely to be tolerated-is to ignore its development and purpose"); Hoffman v.
United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (stating that Fifth Amendment privilege
should be given liberal application); see also LEVY, supra note 10, at 42 (stating that
language used in James Madison's original proposal of Fifth Amendment "revealed
an intent to incorporate into the Constitution the whole scope of the common law
right").
177. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

178. See Moses, 779 F. Supp. at 881 (holding that point of inquiry should be directed not to jurisdiction using compelled testimony but to governmental entity that
would effect such compulsion); In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080, 1085-86 (D. Conn.
1972) (stating that where compulsion of testimony or its use at trial is attempted by
instrumentality of U.S. government, its actions must be limited by Fifth Amendment
regardless of location of feared prosecution).
179. See United States v. (Under Seal), 794 F.2d 920, 925 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 924 (1986).
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ates a dichotomy between the treatment of claimants in civil
and criminal proceedings.' 80 In civil proceedings, witnesses
may invoke their right against self-incrimination and refuse to
answer questions when they fear that their answers may subject
them to criminal prosecution.' 8 1 The "dual sovereignty" holding relies on the premise that the right against self-incrimination should only apply where the sovereign compelling the testimony and the sovereign using the testimony are both restrained by the Fifth Amendment. 8 2 This reasoning does not
apply in some civil actions where civil litigants refuse to answer
questions because they fear prosecution outside the United
States. As a result, the "dual sovereignty" holding fails to apply to most civil cases because a sovereign is not usually a party
83
to a civil action.'
In Yves Farm, Inc. v. Rickett, the "dual sovereignty" holding
ironically enabled claimants in a civil proceeding to claim the
privilege, while refusing the right to claimants in criminal proceedings.1 84 Yves Farm found that the "dual sovereignty" holding does not apply to a civil case in which testimony is being
compelled by private party defendants, and thus allowed private plaintiffs to refuse to answer questions due to risk of prosecution outside the United States. 8 5 In this jurisdiction,
180. See, e.g., Yves Farm, Inc. v. Rickett, 659 F. Supp. 932, 940 (M.D. Ga. 1987)
(allowing Fifth Amendment privilege to protect civil plaintiff from fear of prosecution
outside United States).
181. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing application of privilege
against self-incrimination to protect individuals in civil cases when their testimony
could subject them to risk of criminal prosecution).
182. See Under Seal, 794 F.2d at 925.
183. See Yves Farm, 659 F. Supp. at 940.
184. See id. at 940.
185. See id. In Yves Farm, private defendants wished to compel the plaintiff, a
French citizen, to answer certain questions during a deposition. Id. at 934. Yves Farm
proves that Under Seal's "dual sovereignty" holding does not apply to most civil cases.
See id. at 940 (holding that Under Seal's decision does not apply in this civil case where
sovereign is not party to civil action); see also United States v. (Under Seal), 794 F.2d
920, 925 (4th Cir.) (holding that right against self-incrimination only applies where
sovereign compelling testimony and sovereign using testimony are both governed by
Fifth Amendment), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 924 (1986). In Yves Farm, the U.S. District
Court for the Middle District of Georgia was located within the jurisdiction of the
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and therefore controlled by
Under Seal. Yves Farm allowed a private plaintiff to refuse to testify on the grounds
that the plaintiff feared prosecution outside the United States. Yves Farm, Inc. v.
Rickett, 659 F. Supp. 932, 940 (M.D. Ga. 1987). The court refused to adopt Under
Seal's holding on the ground that Under Seal did not apply to civil cases. See Under Seal,
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therefore, the "dual sovereignty" holding gives the Fifth
Amendment a different scope in criminal cases than in some
civil cases when a sovereign is not a party to the civil action. 8 6
The courts that extend the privilege extraterritorially correctly hold that the policies protected by the privilege warrant
its application to the risk of non-U.S. prosecution. By limiting
the privilege to domestic prosecution, some courts deny individuals under U.S. law their right not to testify against their
own interests. The U.S. government should not strip individuals of their natural right not to be a witness against themselves
merely because the threatened prosecution is abroad.
B. The Supreme Court's Treatment of the Privilege Supports the
ExtraterritorialScope of the Privilege
The Supreme Court's treatment of the privilege also supports the extension of the privilege to include the risk of nonU.S. prosecution. In Murphy, the Supreme Court examined the
Fifth Amendment's language, its underlying policies and its
treatment by other courts. In analyzing whether the Fifth
Amendment's scope encompassed the risk of any domestic
prosecution, the Court stated that the answer depended on
whether such an extension of the privilege promoted or defeated its policies and purposes. 8 7 Murphy held that the fundamental policies behind the Fifth Amendment would be defeated if a federal court could compel a witness to testify despite the risk of prosecution in a state court and vice versa. 88
The Court stated that such a result in particular would defeat
the values of the Fifth Amendment in "our age of cooperative
federalism," in which federal and state governments work to89
gether to fight crime.'
The principles enunciated by Murphy hold equally when an
794 F.2d at 925. The court in Yves Farm stated that the civil case of Yves Farm was
crucially different from Under Seal because a sovereign did not compel the testimony.
Yves Farm, 659 F. Supp. at 940. It could be argued, however, that a sovereign is
compelling the testimony in civil cases due to the doctrine of state action. Civil litigants must move to have the court compel individuals to testify, and thus the subsequent action of the court could be considered state action.
186. See Yves Farm, 659 F. Supp. at 940.
187. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 54 (1964).
188. Id. at 77-78.
189. Id. at 55-56.
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individual fears prosecution outside the United States. 9 '
Compelling witnesses to incriminate themselves under the
laws of non-U.S. jurisdictions defeats most policies and purposes behind the Fifth Amendment.'
Because individuals
must prove the possibility of extradition to the particular country in which they risk prosecution in order to claim the privilege, once a witness proves a real and substantial risk of such
prosecution, that risk will prove equally as realistic and dangerous as any domestic prosecution. 92 In addition, criminal activity has become increasingly international in nature.' 9 3 Similar to the cooperative federalism stressed in Murphy, many
94
countries now work together to battle international crime.
In addition, the courts that limit the privilege to the risk of
domestic prosecution have misinterpreted the reasoning in
Murphy.' 95 These courts have held that the Murphy decision
was simply a logical consequence of the Court's decision in
Malloy v. Hogan,' 9 6 which held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is protected by the Fourteenth
190. See id. (discussing many policies that are protected by right against selfincrimination).
191. See Moses v. Allard, 779 F. Supp. 857, 874 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (stating that
policies behind self-incrimination privilege warrant its extension to fear of prosecution outside United States); see also Michael Scanes, Comment, Extending the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination to the Threat of Prosecution Under Foreign Law, 35 BAYLOR L. REV.
141, 147 (1983) (stating that extension of privilege to protect against fear of nonU.S. prosecution furthers underlying policies of privilege).
192. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text (discussing Flanagan's fivepart test which, if fulfilled, establishes that defendant realistically faces substantial
fear of non-U.S. prosecution).
193. See Moses, 779 F. Supp. at 859 (stating that issue of extraterritorial application of privilege will be increasingly important as criminal activity takes on increasingly international character).
194. See Sukenik, supra note 107, at 366 (discussing plans of United States to
work together with France and Mexico to battle international crime). The United
States has entered into various agreements to develop cooperative practices to reduce illegal drug trafficking. E.g., Narcotic Drugs: Additional Cooperative Arrangements to Curb Illegal Narcotics, April 8, 1981, U.S.-Mex., 33 U.S.T. 1757; Narcotic
Drugs: Coordination of Action Against Illicit Traffic, Mar. 30, 1961, U.S.-Fr., 28
U.S.T. 8045; Multilateral Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, 18 U.S.T.
1407, amended by Protocol, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 1439 [hereinafter Single Convention].
195. See, e.g., Mishima v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 131, 134 (D. Alaska 1981)
(opining that Murphy's rationale was based not only on early English and United
States cases but consisted of review of underlying policies of privilege).
196. 378 U.S. 1 '(1964).
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Amendment against abridgement by the states.' 9 7 This argument, however, inaccurately represents the rationale in Murphy.' 98 The Court in Murphy based its decision on the policies
underlying the self-incrimination privilege.' 9 9 It reviewed the
historical treatment of the privilege in both U.S. and English
courts to determine the proper scope of the Fifth Amendment. 0 0 If the decision in Murphy was mandated by Malloy, the
Court would not have needed to analyze thoroughly the
amendment's scope in Murphy.2 ° '
The natural rights and social contract theories may also
support an extension of the privilege against self-incrimination
to the risk of non-U.S. prosecution.20 2 Courts frequently employ these theories to assess whether the Constitution limits
the actions of the U.S. government when these actions occur
abroad.20 3 These theories may also help to analyze whether
197. d. at 7; see supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text (discussing lower
courts' argument that Murphy decision was merely consequence of Malloy decision).
198. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 54 (stating
that decision depended on whether this broad application of privilege against selfincrimination promotes or defeats its policies and purposes).
199. Id. at 55-57.
200. Id. at 58-77.
201. See id. at 54. Furthermore, in Araneta v. United States, Chief Justice Burger

stated that
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor contains dictum which,
carried to its logical conclusion, would

. .

support such an outcome. That case

held only that the privilege against self-incrimination protects a witness
against compelled disclosures in state court which could also be used
against him in federal court or vice versa. However, the Court also discussed with apparent approval several English cases holding that the privilege
protects a witness from disclosures which could be used against him in a
foreign prosecution.
Araneta v. United States, 478 U.S. 1301, 1304 (1986) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted). Thus, Chief Justice Burger's decision indicates his belief that Murphy approved the English rule that extended the privilege to the threat of non-U.S. prosecution. Contrary to the court's argument in Parker, Murphy's use of English cases was
not "simply by way of argumentative analogy" to the federal-state context. See In re
Parker, 411 F.2d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 1969) (opining that Murphy's discussion of
English cases was simply by way of "argumentative analogy" to federal-state issue
that was present in Murphy), vacated as moot, 397 U.S. 96 (1970). In addition, Chief
Justice Burger's statements suggested his belief that Murphy's evaluation of the
Amendment's scope warranted an extension of the privilege to the threat of non-U.S.
prosecution.
202. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text (discussing social contract and
natural rights theories).
203. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing application of these
theories to determine whether Constitution limits activities of government abroad).
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the privilege against self-incrimination should extend to individuals who risk incrimination outside the United States.20 4
The natural rights theory holds that all government activities are bound by the "higher law" principles which inform the
provisions of the Constitution. 0 5 It states that individuals possess certain universal and unalienable rights that cannot be
abridged by the government.20 6 The incorporation of the Bill
of Rights into the Constitution illustrates the framers' intent to
prohibit government infringement of certain unalienable
The Supreme Court has also invoked both the social contract and natural rights theories to determine the reach of the Constitution to protect aliens in and outside the
United States. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274-75
(1990) (holding that Fourth Amendment does not apply to search by U.S. agents of
Mexican residence of Mexican citizen who was involuntarily present in United
States); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957) (holding that constitutional right to trial
by jury applies to U.S. citizen who accompanied U.S. armed forces outside United
States); In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891) (holding that U.S. Constitution does not
apply to U.S. citizens outside the United States); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
369 (1886) (stating that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not
confined to the protection of citizens").
204. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
205. See BECKER, supra note 76, at 26 (stating that natural law discovered by
human reason "furnish[es] a reliable and immutable standard for testing the ideas,
the conduct, and the institutions of men"); CORWIN, supra note 76, at 89. Professor
Corwin, discussing why legislative sovereignty did not establish itself in the U.S. constitutional system, notes that
the reason is twofold. In the first place in the American written Constitution,
higher law at last attained a form which made possible the attribution to it of
an entirely new sort of validity, the validity of a statute emanatingfrom the sovereign people. Once the binding force of higher law was transferred to this new
basis, the notion of the sovereignty of the ordinary legislative organ disappeared automatically, since that cannot be asovereign law-making body which
is subordinate to another law-making body. But in the second place, even
statutory form could hardly have saved the higher law as a recoursefor individuals had it not been backed up by judicial review. Invested with statutory form
and implemented by judicial review, higher law, as with renewed youth, entered upon one of the great periods of its history, and juristically the most
fruitful one since the days of Justinian.
Id. at 89.
206. See DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (incorporating natural rights theory by stating that "all men . . . are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"); Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1544 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(en banc) (stating that U.S. government officials are creatures of law bound to obey
law), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985); Hunter, supra note 76, at 651
(stating that framers generally believed in natural law restraining governmental authority); see also supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing natural rights theory).
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rights. 20 7 Because the natural rights theory considers all government actions to be constrained by constitutional principles,
this theory supports the extension of the Fifth Amendment
privilege to the risk of non-U.S. prosecution. By compelling
individuals who risk foreign prosecution to testify, the U.S.
government commits an act that infringes a natural right incorporated in the Fifth Amendment that applies regardless of the
jurisdiction in which a prosecution may occur.2 ° a
The social contract theory views the Constitution as a contract between individuals of the United States and the U.S.
government. 2 9 According to this theory, only individuals who
2 °
are parties to the contract have enforceable rights under it. I
This theory, however, does not limit the Fifth Amendment's
ability to protect U.S. citizens and certain aliens in the United
States who risk non-U.S. prosecution. Most individuals who
risk foreign prosecution and thus claim the protection of the
privilege are U.S. citizens. These individuals, therefore,
21
should be considered as parties to the social contract. '
Although the social contract theory may not determine
whether the Fifth Amendment protects against extraterritorial
prosecutions, this theory does not oppose such an extension.
Recently in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,2 1 2 although the
207. See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue,
460 U.S. 575, 584 (1983) (noting that because Constitution as originally proposed
lacked specific limitations on governmental encroachment, Anti-Federalists insisted
on inclusion of Bill of Rights in Constitution).
208. See In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080, 1086 (D. Conn. 1972).
209. Hunter, supra note 76, at 652; Lobel, supra note 77, at 875.
210. See, e.g., League v. DeYoung, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 184, 202 (1850) (stating
Constitution made by and for protection of people of United States); McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404-05 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.) (stating powers of
U.S. government are granted by people for their benefit); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. (2 DalI.) 419,471 (1793) (Jay, C.J.) (noting that Constitution is compact made by
U.S. citizens to govern themselves in certain manner); see also Lobel, supra note 77, at
875 (stating social contract theory view that "[slince nonresident aliens are not parties to the 'contract' and have no obligations under it, they are not entitled to its
protections").
211. See League, 52 U.S. at 202 ("The Constitution of the United States was made
by, and for the protection of, the people of the United States."); McCulloch, 17 U.S. at
404-05 ("The government of the union, then ... is, emphatically and truly, a government of the people .... In form and in substance it emanates from them. Its powers
are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit."); Pauling v. McElroy, 278 F.2d 252, 254 n.3 (D.C. Cir.) (stating that non-resident aliens are not protected by U.S. Constitution), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835 (1960).
212. 494 U.S. 259, 274-75 (1990).
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Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not apply extraterritorially, it noted that the occurrence of a constitutional violation operates differently in the Fourth Amendment
than in the Fifth Amendment. 213 The Court stressed that because the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
is a fundamental trial right of criminal defendants, its constitutional violation occurs only at trial.21 4 In contrast, a violation
of the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches
and seizures occurs at the time of the unreasonable government intrusion.21 5 Thus, in limiting the extraterritorial application of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court looked
at the location in which the constitutional violation occurred. 16 When individuals invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege in a U.S. domestic proceeding because they risk prosecution outside of the United States, the constitutional violation,
unlike the situation present in Verdugo-Urquidez, occurs in the
United States. 2 7 The Fifth Amendment thus should protect
U.S. citizens and occupants of the United States from testifying
in a U.S. court when they fear that such testimony could be
used against them in another country.
C. The Framers of the Fifth Amendment Intended the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination to Apply Extraterritorially
An analysis of the framers' intent in developing the Bill of
Rights demonstrates that the self-incrimination privilege
should protect individuals in the United States against the risk
of non-U.S. prosecution. 21 8 The privilege against self-incrimi213. See id. at 264 (stating that Fourth Amendment operates in different manner
from Fifth Amendment).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See id. (stating that "for purposes of this case . . . if there were a constitutional violation, it occurred solely in Mexico").
217. See id. at 264 (stating the constitutional violation of privilege against selfincrimination occurs only at trial).
218. See LEVY, supra note 10, at 432 (stating that "[a]bove all, the Fifth Amendment reflected [the framers'] judgment that in a free society, based on respect for the
individual, the determination of guilt or innocence by just procedures, in which the
accused made no unwilling contribution to his conviction, was more important than
punishing the guilty"); see also Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956)
(stating that "[tihe privilege against self-incrimination is a specific provision of which
it is peculiarly true that 'a page of history is worth a volume of logic' "), overruled on
othergrounds by Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Quinn v. United States,
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nation is an ancient and venerable right that has been recognized for centuries as an essential protection of the individual
against abuse by the government. 1 9 In biblical times, as well
as in medieval England, rights similar to the privilege against
self-incrimination existed and provided individuals with broad
protection against oppressive government conduct. 22 0

This

historical background, combined with the framers' belief that
without fair and just procedures there could be no secure liberty, paved the way for the development of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.22 '
The context in which the Constitution was drafted proves
extremely relevant in evaluating the framers' intention in creating the privilege. The Bill of Rights was written immediately
after the colonies fought a war to free themselves from control
of a foreign sovereign.222 Due to the political context in which
the framers of the Constitution created the Fifth Amendment,
it is unlikely that they would have established a right which the
U.S. government must honor but which might be abridged by
the U.S. government for the benefit of another country's government.223 Such a limited interpretation of the amendment
349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955) (noting that "[c]oequally with our other constitutional
guarantees, the Self-Incrimination Clause 'must be accorded liberal construction in
favor of the right it was intended to secure' "); Maffie v. United States, 209 F.2d 225,
227 (1st Cir. 1954) (stating that framers of Constitution "made a judgment and expressed it in our fundamental law, that it were better for an occasional crime to go
unpunished than that the prosecution should be free to build up a criminal case, in
whole or in part, with the assistance of enforced disclosures by the accused").

219. See supra notes 10-21 and accompanying text (discussing historical development of privilege against self-incrimination).
220. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text (discussing privilege's development because of abolishment of oppressive oath ex officio).
221. See LEVY, supra note 10, at 431 (stating that "[t]he framers understood that
without fair and regularized procedures to protect the criminally accused, there
could be no liberty").
222. See THOMAS A. BAILEY & DAVID M. KENNEDY, THE AMERICAN PAGEANT 127
(8th ed. 1987) (discussing impact that American Revolution had on social customs,
political institutions, and ideas about society and government in newly formed
United States). In The American Pageant, the authors note that "[t]he root causes of
the Revolution may well have been the need to resist what the colonists feared to be
the conspiracy of a corrupt British government to deprive them of their liberties."
Id. at 106.
223. In Moses v. Allard, the court noted the historical context in which the Fifth
Amendment was adopted. Moses v. Allard, 779 F. Supp. 857, 874 n.24 (E.D. Mich.
1991). The court in Moses observed that "one can hardly believe that our Founders
would have formulated a fundamental right which could be exercised on American
soil under the American Constitution and which could not be abridged by an Ameri-
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would allow compulsion of a U.S. citizen's testimony which
could be used in the prosecution of that individual in other
countries.
Many of the policies protected by the Bill of Rights
originated in English common law. 2 4 It is likely that, at the
time the Bill of Rights was adopted, English common law extended the self-incrimination privilege to protect against the
risk of prosecution in other countries.225 The early English
case of East India Co. v. Campbell 2 26 allowed the self-incrimination privilege to apply to English defendants who risked prosecution in India.2 2 7 Although, at the time East India Co. was decan government but which could be abridged for the benefit of a foreign government
or monarch." Id.
224. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 600 (1896). In Brown, Justice Brown
stated that
[a]s the object of the first eight amendments to the Constitution was to incorporate into the fundamental law of the land certain principles of natural
justice which had become permanently fixed in the jurisprudence of the
mother country, the construction given to those principles by the English
courts is cogent evidence of what they were designed to secure and of the
limitations that should be put upon them. This is but another application of
the familiar rule that, where one State adopts the laws of another, it is also
presumed to adopt the known and settled construction of those laws by the
courts of the State from which they are taken.
Id; see McDonald v. Hovey, 110 U.S. 619 (1884). In McDonald, the Court addressed
an issue concerning the construction that should be given to the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court stated that when English statutes have been adopted into
U.S. legislation, the known and settled construction of those statutes by courts of law
are silently incorporated into the acts. Id. at 628; see Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78, 119 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting an author of constitutional law who
wrote that "[w]hen the first Continental Congress of 1774 claimed to be entitled to
the benefit .

.

. of the common law of England .

.

. they simply declared the basic

principle of English law that English subjects going to a new and uninhabited country
carry with them, as their birth right, the laws of England existing when the colonization takes place") (citations omitted).
225. See East India Co. v. Campbell, 27 Eng. Rep. 1010, 1011 (Ex. 1749).
226. Id.
227. Id. In Moses v. Allard, the creditors who were trying to compel the debtor,
Ms. Moses, to testify, argued that the English case of East India Co. involved jurisdictions under the legislative sovereignty of the English laws. Moses, 779 F. Supp. at
876. The court in Moses found, by reviewing the court's opinion in East India Co., that
the English courts viewed the India courts and the English courts as two separate
entities. Id. Moses therefore held that East India, which was decided before the U.S.
Constitution was enacted, extended the privilege to the risk of prosecution in foreign
jurisdictions. Id. But see Phoenix Assurance Co. of Can. v. Runck, 317 N.W.2d 402,
411 (N.D.) (dismissing significance of Murphy's reliance on English cases by stating
that some English cases involved prosecution in English colonies), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 862 (1982). See also R.D.G., supra note 28, at 894 (arguing that English courts
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cided, India was under the control of England, the language of
the decision of East India Co. shows that the Indian courts and
the English courts were viewed as separate entities. 2 28 Thus,

when the framers developed the Fifth Amendment, they likely
incorporated the broad scope of the self-incrimination privilege that was adhered to in England.229
In a footnote in his concurring opinion in Murphy, Justice
Harlan questioned the clarity of the English rule regarding the
extraterritorial application of the privilege.2 3 He stated that
East India Co. involved disclosures that would be incriminating
under a separate system of laws operating within the same legislative sovereignty. 23 ' The English court's decision in McRae,
however, did not involve the risk of prosecution in a jurisdiction within England's legislative sovereignty. 232 In addition,
the rationale of the court in East India Co. shows that it based
had not decided case involving incrimination under laws of independent foreign sovereigns at time U.S. Constitution was created, therefore, amendment did not incorporate any rule concerning foreign incrimination); Capra, supra note 50 (stating that
English cases involving independent sovereigns were decided more than 60 years
after Fifth Amendment was adopted).
228. East India Co., 27 Eng. Rep. at 1011. The court stated that "the rule is, that
this court shall not oblige one to discover that, which, if he answers in the affirmative,
will subject him to the punishment of a crime ... and that he is punishable appears
from the case of Omichund v. Baker [1 Atk 21], as ajurisdiction is erected in Calcutta
for criminal facts; where he may be sent to government and tried, though not punishable here ... for the government may send persons to answer for a crime wherever
committed, that he may not involve his country." Id. (emphasis added); see Moses v. Al-

lard, 779 F. Supp. 857, 876 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (stating that review of opinion of East
India Co., as well as another English court opinion suggests that English courts
viewed trying bodies as two separate entities).
229. See Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955); Brown v. Walker,
161 U.S. 591, 600 (1896). In Moses v. Allard, the court stated that
[a]s adopted in English common law, [the right against self-incrimination]
was a broad and fundamental protection of the individual against the abuses
of a government. The right, as interpreted prior to the formation of our
Constitution, provided for the extension of this fundamental privilege to
foreign proceedings. It was this broad conception of the privilege that was
adopted by the Founding Fathers.
Moses, 779 F. Supp. at 883; see LEVY, supra note 10, at 428 (stating that "[a]fter the
adoption of the Fifth Amendment, the earliest state and federal cases were in accord
with [the privilege's] previous history, which suggests that whatever the wording of
the constitutional formulation, it did not supersede or even limit the common-law
right").
230. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 81-82 n.l
(1964) (Harlan, J., concurring).
231. Id.
232. Justice Harlan also stated that the situation in McRae, where the U.S.
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its decision on the privilege's ability to protect against the risk
of incrimination in another country.2 3 3
Furthermore, most of the purposes underlying the privilege apply to the risk of prosecution outside the United
States.23 4 The framers created the privilege in order to avoid
subjecting an individual to the "cruel trilemma" of self-incrimination, perjury, or contempt. 35 This "cruel trilemma" exists
regardless of whether the defendant fears prosecution in the
United States or outside its borders. 2 36 The defendant who
risks prosecution outside the United States is still compelled to
237
choose among self-incrimination, perjury, or contempt.
Moreover, the framers intended the privilege to focus on the
individual's right to be free from inhumane treatment and
abuse by the government.2 3 8 Compelling an individual to give
self-incriminating testimony, regardless of the location of the
prosecution, subjects an individual to unjust treatment by the
government.23 9
D. Immunity Does Not Protect Against the Risk of Non-U.S.
Prosecution
The Supreme Court allows grants of immunity to replace
the right against self-incrimination, provided that the grant of
immunity is coextensive with the protection of the Fifth
Amendment.2 4 ° Immunity, however, does not consistently
wished to obtain answers in England that would incriminate the defendant in the
United States is distinguishable from the facts in Murphy. Id.
233. See East India Co. v. Campbell, 27 Eng. Rep. 1010, 1011 (Ex. 1749) (stating
that privilege against self-incrimination protects individuals who risk prosecution in
India because government car, send person to answer crime wherever committed
although it may not involve that individual's country).
234. See Sukenik, supra note 107, at 373 (stating that analysis of underlying policies favors broad interpretation of privilege).
235. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
236. See Moses v. Allard, 779 F. Supp. 857, 874 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (opining that
intent behind Fifth Amendment was that privilege protects individual against unlawful compulsion by any government, regardless of fortuitous nature of jurisdiction
involved).
237. See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55 (discussing importance and definition of "cruel
trilemma").
238. Id.
239. Moses, 779 F. Supp. at 874.
240. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
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safeguard Fifth Amendment rights.2 4 ' When a witness fears
non-U.S. prosecution and is compelled to testify, the witness is
in a much worse position than if the witness had remained silent.2 4 2 In such a case, immunity does not afford the individual
the same protection as the privilege against self-incrimination
because immunity fails to assure that the testimony will not
lead to criminal penalties.2 4 3
Once a witness has received immunity, the "derivative
use" prohibition of the U.S. Statute on Immunity of Witnesses
safeguards the use of this testimony by domestic authorities.2 4 4
This statute bars the U.S. government from using compelled
testimony in any criminal case against a witness who receives
immunity. 24 5 U.S. courts can exclude compelled testimony acquired through the use of such testimony.2 4 6 This judicial control persuaded the U.S. Supreme Court to allow grants of immunity to replace the self-incrimination privilege when a de2471iilcnrl
Such judicial control,
fendant fears domestic prosecution.
however, is absent when a U.S. citizen fears prosecution
outside the United States because the U.S. government has no
power to regulate the use of testimony in such a prosecution.2 48
In Kastigar v. United States,2 419 the Supreme Court stated
that immunity statutes must concentrate on elimination of the
risk of prosecution. 2 10 When a risk of prosecution exists
241. See id. at 449 (stating that immunity suffices to supplant Fifth Amendment
privilege only when grant of immunity is coextensive with scope of privilege).
242. See Sukenik, supra note 107, at 382 (stating that secrecy of grand jury proceedings, without more, does not offer protection equivalent to witness's right to
remain silent).
243. See Kastigar,406 U.S. at 449 (holding that immunity ensures that testimony
cannot lead to criminal penalties when individual fears domestic prosecution and
thus affords same protection as privilege).
244. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1988) (discussing requirements for immunity).
245. See id.

246. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972).
247. In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080, 1082 (D. Conn. 1972); see Sukenik, supra
note 107, at 382 (discussing ability of government to keep compelled testimony from
being disclosed for use in subsequent cases).
248. Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. at 1082; Sukenik, supra note 107, at 382.
249. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
250. See id. at 449; Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585 (1892) (holding
that no statute that leaves party or witness subject to prosecution after party or witness answers incriminating question can have effect of supplanting privilege against
self-incrimination), overruled on other grounds by Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441
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outside the United States, the government cannot eliminate
this risk through grants of immunity. 2 5 ' This limitation of immunity should not affect the Fifth Amendment's ability to protect individuals from unwillingly testifying when they fear that
their testimony will incriminate them outside the United
States. Although extension of the self-incrimination privilege
extraterritorially may impede the government's ability to obtain testimony and may burden law enforcement officials, these
results do not justify denying an individual the right against
25 3
self-incrimination. 2 52 As the Court stated in Reid v. Covert,
allowing the Bill of Rights to become inoperative because of
expediency and inconvenience would undermine the Constitution as well as the basis of the U.S. government. 5 4
Immunity was developed as a substitute for Fifth Amendment rights to aid governmental interests in obtaining testimony. 55 Courts that limit the privilege to domestic prosecution reason that non-U.S. laws should not supersede the ability
of the U.S. government to grant immunity.2 5 6 By limiting the
scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege, however, these courts
allow government interests to supersede individual rights.25 7
Although extension of the privilege to non-U.S. prosecutions
may frustrate grants of immunity, limiting the privilege frustrates Fifth Amendment rights.2 58 Judicial protection of Fifth
(1972). Congress and the Supreme Court found that the conceptual basis of this
language in Counselman permitted use and derivative use to be considered coextensive
with the scope of the privilege. See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 451-53.
251. Sukenik, supra note 107, at 384.
252. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (noting that when United States acts
against its citizens outside of United States, it can do so only in accordance with all
limitations imposed by Constitution).
253. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
254. See id. The Supreme Court in Reid stated that
[t]he concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections
against arbitrary government are inoperative when they become inconvenient or when expediency dictates otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine
and if allowed to flourish would destroy the benefit of a written Constitution
and undermine the basis of our Government.
Id. at 14.
255. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462 (1972).
256. See Phoenix Assurance Co. of Can. v. Runck, 317 N.W.2d 402, 412 (N.D.)
(holding that privilege should not apply extraterritorially because such extension
would frustrate U.S. government's ability to grant immunity), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
862 (1982).
257. See id.
258. See Moses v. Allard, 779 F. Supp. 857, 882 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (noting that
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Amendment rights thus should be more expansive than the
ability to grant immunity. The goal of immunity statutes is to
provide substantially the same protection as the right against
self-incrimination. 259 Fifth Amendment rights should not van-

ish in instances where grants of immunity cannot fulfill this
goal.
E. Rule 6(e) Does Not Eliminate the Risk of Non-U.S. Prosecution
Moreover, a close examination of Rule 6(e) reveals its inadequacy as a safeguard against possible self-incrimination.260
Although Rule 6(e) provides for the general secrecy of grand
jury testimony, it contains a broad exception to this general
rule. 26 ' Rule 6(e) permits the disclosure of testimony to a governmental agency without a court order to aid a prosecutor in
the performance of official duties.262 As criminal acts become
more international in scope, nations increasingly cooperate to
fight international crime. 263 In compliance with certain international treaties, a U.S. prosecutor may have a duty to disclose
information to non-U.S. officials. 264

Thus, because of the

although extension of amendment may burden law enforcement officials, courts cannot abrogate right solely on that ground).
259. Kastigar,406 U.S. at 460-63. Some commentors argue, however, that if use
immunity cannot extend to prohibit a certain use of compelled testimony, then the
Fifth Amendment should not prohibit such use. See Capra, supra note 50 ("[I]f use
immunity is co-extensive with the privilege, it follows that there is no constitutional
limitation on use of testimony beyond the scope of the immunity grant."). This argument, however, would cause the scope of the Fifth Amendment to be determined by
the ability of the government to grant immunity in the particular situation.
260. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) (setting forth requirements for grand jury secrecy); see also In re Flanagan, 691 F.2d 116, 123 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that Rule
6(e) does not guarantee that grand jury testimony will not be disclosed to governments outside United States).
261. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3) (setting forth exceptions to grand jury secrecy
requirements); supra notes 104 and accompanying text (discussing requirements and
exceptions to RULE 6(e) which governs secrecy of grand jury testimony).
262. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3); see supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing requirements for secrecy in grand jury proceedings). A prosecutor's duty is not
limited to the matter under investigation by the grand jury. In re Lemieux, 597 F.2d
1166, 1168 (9th Cir. 1979) (Hufstedler, J., concurring). Rule 6(e) also allows disclosure to non-attorneys, without a court order, provided it will aid prosecutors in the
performance of their duties. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3).
263. See supra note 194 and accompanying text (discussing cooperative efforts
between nations in fighting international crime).
264. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3). In In re Baird, however, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that Rule 6(e) sufficiently protected against possible communication of grand jury testimony to law enforcement agents from a non-
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prosecutorial aid exception, Rule 6(e) may not protect the witness from the performance of a government attorney's duty to
disclose information to non-U.S. countries in compliance with
such international treaties.2 6 5
The secrecy requirements of grand jury proceedings do
not eliminate an individual's risk of non-U.S. prosecution.
Courts cannot adequately protect the secrecy of grand jury testimony after an indictment has .been returned.2 6 6 Courts must
disclose grand jury testimony to defendants if that testimony
contains exculpatory material.2 6 7 Courts also have allowed disclosure when grand jury testimony is relevant to a motion to
dismiss an indictment or when it is relevant to a double jeopardy claim.2 6 8 The argument that Rule 6(e) eliminates the risk
of non-U.S. prosecution also assumes that law enforcement
agents will always adhere to the disclosure requirements of
2 69
Rule 6(e).
In Flanagan, the court held that Rule 6(e) did not eliminate
the claimant's risk of non-U.S. prosecution because grand jury
proceedings are not "leakproof. ' ' 2 70 Grand jurors might knowingly or unknowingly disclose information. 2 7 ' Flanagan thus
adopted a case-by-case evaluation of the claimant's risk of nonU.S. country under the Single Convention. In re Baird, 668 F.2d 432 (8th Cir. 1982);
see supra note 194 and accompanying text (citing Single Convention). The Single
Convention is subject to the constitutional, legal and administrative systems of each
of the parties. Baird, 668 F.2d at 433. Therefore, the court held that the Single Convention was governed by the requirements of Rule 6(e). Id.; see supra note 194 and
accompanying text (citing Single Convention).
265. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e); see also supra note 104 and accompanying text
(setting forth requirements and exceptions of grand jury secrecy under Rule 6(e)).
266. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3) (setting forth exceptions to grand jury secrecy);
see also Lemieux, 597 F.2d at 1168 (Hufstedler, J., concurring). In a concurring opinion in Lemieux, Judge Hufstedler stated that the assumption that disclosure cannot
occur without violating Rule 6(e) is unsupported by the rule itself and is also unacceptably disingenuous. Id.
267. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (requiring disclosure of
grand jury minutes which contained exculpatory material).
268. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 420 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1970) (permitting
disclosure of grand jury minutes that were relevant to motion to dismiss an indictment); United States v. Hughes, 413 F.2d 1244, 1257 (5th Cir. 1969) (allowing disclosure when grand jury minutes were relevant to double jeopardy claim), vacated as
moot, United States v. Gifford-Hill-American, Inc., 397 U.S. 93 (1970).
269. In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080, 1082 (D. Conn. 1972).
270. In re Flanagan, 691 F.2d 116, 123 (2d Cir. 1982).
271. Id.
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U.S. prosecution with the aid of a five-factor test.272 The
Flanagan test may be applied in cases other than grand jury
proceedings to determine if a claimant's fear is reasonable.2 7 3
This test evaluates the surrounding circumstances behind an
individual's alleged risk of prosecution instead of relying solely
on the good faith of the court, grand jurors, and law enforcement officials.274
Flanagan'sfive-part test adequately determines whether an
individual faces a real risk of non-U.S. prosecution by evaluating all relevant circumstances. 27' Therefore, instead of assuming the adequacy of Rule 6(e), courts should utilize the Flanagan test as a reliable way to evaluate the real risk require76
ment.

2

CONCLUSION
The privilege against self-incrimination should protect
U.S. citizens and aliens within the United States from testifying
when faced with the risk of prosecution outside the United
States. Courts should adhere to the purposes, intent, and history supporting the privilege by extending its protection to the
threat of non-U.S. prosecution.
In addition, U.S. courts
should evaluate a witness's risk of non-U.S. prosecution on a
case-by-case basis by employing the five-part test developed in
In re Flanagan. By applying Flanagan's test, courts will be able
to use a uniform standard for all cases while also considering
the individual factors peculiar to each case.
Debra Ciardiello*
272. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text (setting forth Flanagan'sfivepart test).
273. See Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052,
1064-65 (3d Cir. 1988) (employing Flanagan'sfive-part test to evaluate defendants'
fear of prosecution outside United States), aft'd, 493 U.S. 400 (1990); United States
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274. See Flanagan, 691 F.2d at 121.
275. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text (discussing Flanagan five-part
test, which assesses all relevant circumstances).
276. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text (discussing Flanagan test).
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